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INTRODUCTION 
It is an open question whether the prohibition on employment 
discrimination in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects 
plaintiffs who have not attempted to mitigate the effect of their 
disability on their ability to work. Suppose, for example, that a job 
applicant has severely impaired vision because of a corneal disease.1 
* Associate Professor, University of Chicago Law School; Visiting Associate Professor, 
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like to thank Samuel Bagenstos, Jack Balkin, Michael Berube, Adrienne Davis, Elizabeth 
Emens, Allan Erbsen, Leslie Francis, Ann Hubbard, Jerry Mashaw, Carol Rose, Anita 
Silvers, Aviam Soifer, Michael Stein, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, and the participants in 
faculty workshops at the Northwestern University School of Law, the sixth annual meeting 
of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, and the 2003 annual 
meeting of the Law and Society Association. The University of Chicago Law Library 
provided excellent research assistance. The Lee and Brena Freeman Faculty Research Fund 
and the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund contributed financial support. © 2004, Jill 
Elaine Hasday. 
1. See, e.g. , Yaron s. Rabinowitz, Keratoconus, 42 SURV. OPHTHALMOLOGY 297, 298-99 
(1998) ("Keratoconus is a condition in which the cornea assumes a conical shape as a result 
of noninflammatory thinning of the corneal stroma. The corneal thinning induces irregular 
astigmatism, myopia, and protrusion, leading to mild to marked impairment in the quality of 
vision. It is a progressive disorder ultimately affecting both eyes . . . .  ") (footnote omitted); 
Karla Zadnik et al., Biomicroscopic Signs and Disease Severity in Keratoconus, 15 CORNEA 
139, 139 (1996) ("Keratoconus is characterized by symptoms of visual distortion, observable 
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He can have corneal transplant surgery that his doctors recommend 
and expect will allow him to see much more clearly,2 but he does not 
want to have the surgery because of the complications sometimes 
associated with the operation and the possibility that the surgery will 
not work.3 He applies for a job that has been structured for people 
who can see clearly and asks the employer to purchase work 
equipment (like a new computer) that will enable him to perform the 
job with limited eyesight. Purchasing this equipment will be costly, and 
the employer asks why it should have to bear those costs when the 
applicant could have surgery to enable him to see better. 
The question raises a core issue of rights and responsibilities under 
a civil rights law. But Title I of the ADA,4 which protects "a qualified 
individual with a disability" from employment discrimination based on 
his disability,5 never indicates whether there is a duty to mitigate, 
either by undergoing medical procedures, using medication, pursuing 
physical therapy, losing weight, abstaining from alcohol and cigarettes, 
or taking other measures to improve health and eliminate obstacles to 
employment. The Supreme Court has not yet considered the question, 
and legal commentators have all but ignored it.6 The few lower courts 
corneal irregularity that steepens with time, classic slit-lamp biomicroscopic signs (Vogt's 
striae and Fleischer's ring), and progressive corneal scarring.") (citation omitted}. 
2. See, e.g. , Kurt A. Buzard & Bradley R. Fundingsland, Corneal Transplant for 
Keratoconus: Results in Early and Late Disease, 23 J. CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY 
398, 405 (1997) ("(T]he results of this study indicate that . . .  corneal transplantation (is] the 
primary choice for permanently eliminating visual problems in eyes with early and moderate 
keratoconus."); Rabinowitz, supra note 1, at 315 ("Corneal transplant (penetrating 
keratoplasty) is the best and most successful surgical option for keratoconus patients who 
cannot tolerate contact lenses or are not adequately visually rehabilitated by them. Central 
scarring may preclude good vision from contact lenses, even when they are tolerated."}. 
3. See, e.g. , M.L. Chipman et al., Changing Risk for Early Transplant Failure: Data from 
the Ontario Corneal Recipient Registry, 28 CANADIAN J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 254, 254 (1993) 
("To examine the joint effects of donor, recipient and surgical characteristics on the risk of 
early corneal transplant failure, 73 cases of early failure (no period of clarity or clarity lasting 
no more than 28 days) reported to the Ontario Corneal Recipient Registry were compared 
with 1591 control transplants remaining clear for 6 months or more. In logistic regression 
models donor age was significantly associated with graft failure, with the odds of failure 
increasing by 24% per decade. In recipients with a history of cataract or glaucoma or with an 
intraocular lens in place the relative odds of failure ranged from 2.16 to 3.08. Among surgical 
factors, larger grafts increased risk by 45% per 0.25 mm."); Rabinowitz, supra note 1, at 315 
("Because of the avascular nature of the cornea, corneal transplant has a success rate of 93-
96% . . . .  Complete visual recovery may, however, take as long as 6 months. Patients who are 
candidates for penetrating keratoplasty should be counseled that in spite of the high success 
rate of surgery there is still a 50% chance that they may need contact lenses, either because 
of residual myopia or postkeratoplasty astigmatism."); id. at 316 ("In compliant patients, 
complications after penetrating keratoplasty are rare. These may include rejection, 
postoperative astigmatism, a fixed dilated pupil, and recurrence of keratoconus."). 
4. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12111-12117 (2000). 
5. Id. § 12112(a). 
6. For a discussion of the sparse existing literature, see infra note 54 and accompanying 
text. 
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to address a duty to mitigate under Title I are divided on whether 
mitigation should be required,7 and those in favor of the duty have not 
developed a clear standard for when that duty should apply.8 To the 
extent that the decisions supporting a duty to mitigate imply any 
principle for implementing the duty, most appear to suggest that Title 
I plaintiffs are obligated to mitigate whenever mitigation is possible. I 
reject both extremes of the existing debate. This Article argues that 
plaintiffs seeking Title I protection should be under a duty to mitigate, 
but that this duty should require plaintiffs to pursue only those 
mitigating measures that could reduce their need for workplace 
accommodation and that a reasonable person in the same situation 
would pursue. 
The question of whether, when, and why there is a duty to mitigate 
under Title I of the ADA is important both doctrinally and 
theoretically, and courts enforcing Title I will inevitably have to decide 
it. Employer-defendants are beginning to press the issue, and existing 
ADA case law-combined with tort jurisprudence, medical literature, 
and disabled people's own accounts-makes clear that some people do 
not mitigate their disabilities when mitigation is possible. 
First, many disabled people do not want to bear the risks or side 
effects associated with some mitigating procedures. These risks and 
side effects range from the very serious to the less so. The failure rates 
for mitigating measures vary widely. The side effects associated with 
mitigation may be mild, but may also entail permanent neurological 
damage, impaired memory, impaired cognitive function, dulled 
creativity, aggressive behavior, hyperactivity, tremors, seizures, 
7. For cases holding that courts will consider only mitigation that the plaintiff has 
undertaken, see Nawrot v. CPC Int'!, 277 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 2002); Williams v. 
Thresholds, Inc., No. 02 C 9101, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2003); EEOC v. Voss 
Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1358 & n.2 (W.D. Okla. 2003); Bertinetti v. Joy Mining 
Mach., 231 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833-34 (S.D. Ill. 2002); Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 
F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037 (D. Ariz. 1999); infra note 53 and accompanying text. For a case 
holding that a failure to mitigate reduces the plaintiff's damage award, but does not defeat 
the plaintiff's claim, see Capizzi v. County of Placer, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1 105, 1112-13 (E.D. Cal. 
2001); infra note 53 and accompanying text. For cases holding or suggesting that plaintiffs 
are under a duty to mitigate, see cases cited infra note 8. For a case in which the defendant 
raised the duty to mitigate issue, but the court did not reach it, see Fraser v. United States 
Bancorp, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193 (D. Or. 2001). 
8. For cases finding a duty to mitigate, see Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ. 7393 
(AKH), slip op. at 7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003); Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp. 
2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Rose v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614 (D. 
Md. 2002); Hewitt v. Akan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); 
Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 
(4th Cir. 2000) (mem.); infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. For cases that seem to 
suggest, less clearly, that there is a duty to mitigate, see Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 
181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1999); Mont-Ros v. City of West Miami, 111  F. Supp. 2d 1338, 
1356-57 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Llante v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 3091, slip op. at 
12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1999); Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232-33 
(D. Kan. 1999); Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937 F. Supp. 541, 548 (E.D. Va. 
1996); infra notes 69, 71 and accompanying text. 
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blurred vision, hypothyroidism, blood disorders, liver damage, 
sedation, sleep disturbances, sexual dysfunction, weight gain, birth 
defects for one's children, pain, or death.9 
Second, some disabled people are unable or unwilling to avoid 
practices and conditions-like smoking, drinking alcohol, or being 
substantially overweight-that harm their overall health and can 
intensify the consequences of their disabilities. District courts have 
already considered Title I suits brought by a plaintiff who did not stop 
smoking when his doctor advised him that smoking aggravated his 
respiratory problems,10 by a plaintiff who did not abstain from alcohol 
and start exercising when her doctor advised her that doing so would 
help control her diabetes,11 and by a plaintiff who did not lose weight 
when his doctors advised him that weight loss would alleviate his sleep 
apnea.12 More cases like these are certain to arise. 
Third, some disabled people are unable to afford some, or any, 
mitigating measures. The jurisprudence on people injured by tort, for 
example, reveals disabled people unable to pay for surgery that 
Medicaid would not cover,13 unable to pay for surgery that their health 
insurance would not cover,14 unable to pay for surgery because they 
had no health insurance,15 and unable to take time off from work so 
that an injury could heal because they had no disability insurance to 
support them in the interim.16 
Fourth, some disabled people, members of the deaf community 
most prominent among them, publicly state that they do not attempt 
to mitigate because they understand their disabilities to be central to 
their cultural identities. Cochlear implant surgery, for example, has 
enabled some deaf people to process sounds well enough to 
understand speech.17 Other deaf people, however, refuse the surgery, 
not because of its considerable risks and limitations,18 but because they 
believe that their deafness is a crucial part of who they are. A 
president of the National Association of the Deaf, for instance, has 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 72-104. 
10. See Rose, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 614-15, 614 n.7. 
11. See Fraser, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1 191. 
12. See Mont-Ros, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1346, 1356. 
13. See McGee v. Jones, 499 S.E.2d 398, 400-01 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). 
14. See Seagers v. Pailet, 656 So. 2d 700, 713-14 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
15. See Gunn v. Robertson, 801 So. 2d 555, 561 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Dunn v. Maxey, 693 
N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
16. See Etheredge v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 814 So. 2d 1 19, 121-23 (La. Ct. App. 
2002). 
17. See infra text accompanying note 72. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
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expressed such sentiments: '"I'm happy with who I am,"' she has 
declared, "'and I don't want to be 'fixed.""19 
In addition to the practical urgency of resolving the duty to 
mitigate question, examining the issue of whether there is a duty to 
mitigate under Title I also casts new light on an important debate in 
the Title I case law and scholarship about the extent of the differences 
between Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
which prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin."20 The traditional view in this debate, 
advanced by many courts21 and commentators,22 holds that Title I and 
19. Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, ATLANTIC, Sept. 1993, at 37, 38 (quoting 
Roslyn Rosen). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
21. See, e.g. , Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. & Univs. for Northeastern Ill. 
Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Title I of the ADA, by contrast [with, inter alia, 
Title VII], requires employers to consider and to accommodate disabilities, and in the 
process extends beyond the anti-discrimination principle."); Harter v. Univ. of Indianapolis, 
5 F. Supp. 2d 657, 661 (S.D. Ind. 1998) ("Unlike other federal employment discrimination 
laws (including Title VII], the ADA does not simply forbid discrimination on a particular 
basis. The ADA imposes an affirmative duty on employers to provide 'reasonable 
accommodations' for a disabled employee.") (citations omitted); Dunlap v. Ass'n of Bay 
Area Gov'ts, 996 F. Supp. 962, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("(T]he analogy between race and 
gender discrimination claims brought under Title VII and disability discrimination claims 
brought under the ADA is extremely limited. In an action for race or gender discrimination, 
a plaintiff must prove that she was treated differently from those similarly situated because 
of a protected characteristic. In contrast, under the ADA, a person with a disability need not 
prove that she was treated differently from non-disabled individuals. Discrimination may be 
shown precisely where the defendant treated plaintiff the same as everyone around her, 
despite her need for reasonable accommodation.") (citation omitted). 
22 See, e.g. , Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) ("(U]nder the civil rights statutes that 
protect women, blacks, or older workers, plaintiffs can complain of discrimination against 
them, but they cannot insist upon discrimination in their favor; disabled individuals often 
can.") (footnote omitted); id. at 9 ("(T]he ADA declares it illegal to deny an individual an 
employment opportunity by failing to take account of her disability when taking account of 
it-in the sense of changing the job or physical environment of the workplace-would 
enable her to do the work. This is a far different definition of 'discrimination' than the 
definition embraced in other areas of employment discrimination law. Title VII, for instance, 
essentially takes jobs as it finds them . . . .  The failure to undertake positive steps to revamp 
the job or the environment does not constitute discrimination."); Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for 
Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-4 (2000) ("The ADA 
incorporated a profoundly different model of equality from that associated with traditional 
non-discrimination statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Those statutes, for 
the most part, were geared toward achieving only formal equality: equal treatment of 
similarly situated individuals . . . .  The ADA required not only that disabled individuals be 
treated no worse than non-disabled individuals with whom they were similarly situated, but 
also directed that in certain contexts they be treated differently, arguably better, to achieve 
an equal effect.") (footnotes omitted); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable 
Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1199-1200 (2003) 
("The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) differs fundamentally from Title 
VII. . . .  The central thrust of Title VII employs a 'sameness' model of discrimination, 
requiring employers to treat African Americans and women exactly the same as others; their 
race and sex must be ignored and employers must focus instead on factors related to 
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Title VII are fundamentally different because Title I imposes 
significant costs on employers, while Title VII does not. This argument 
emphasizes that Title I has a reasonable accommodation provision 
that Title VII lacks. That provision requires an employer to provide a 
disabled employee or job applicant who cannot perform a job as it is 
currently structured with reasonable accommodations that alter the 
job so that the disabled person can fill it,23 unless the employer "can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of [its] business. "24 The traditionalists 
contend that this requirement places great costs on employers and that 
employers bear no equivalent burden under Title VII. More recently, 
a group of revisionists, led by Christine Jolls, has argued that the 
traditional view overstates the differences between Title I and Title 
VII.25 The revisionists ·note that Title VII also imposes costs on 
employers, including costs resulting from the statute's prohibition on 
intentional discrimination or "disparate treatment." For instance, Title 
VII forces employers to adopt nondiscriminatory hiring practices that 
may alienate prejudiced customers and coworkers who want to 
interact only with employees who have particular demographic 
characteristics.26 Title VII also prohibits employers from making 
productivity. Although the ADA uses a sameness model in part, its distinctive thrust is a 
'difference' model, requiring employers to treat individuals with disabilities differently and 
more favorably than others. Employers must treat individuals with disabilities as qualified if 
they 'can perform the essential functions' of the job. Empl.oyers are free to treat others as 
qualified only if they can perform all of the functions of the job. Similarly, employers must 
make 'reasonable accommodations' for individuals with disabilities. Sometimes these 
accommodations may be expensive or require significant alterations in the way a job is 
structured. Yet neither Title VII nor the ADA require employers to make these 
accommodations for others. ") (footnotes omitted). 
23. See 42 U.S. C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(9) (2000). 
24. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
25. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 
645 (2001) ("[I]n a broader respect than has generally been appreciated, some aspects of 
antidiscrimination Jaw - in particular its disparate impact branch - are in fact 
requirements of accommodation. In such instances it is hard to resist the conclusion that 
antidiscrimination and accommodation are overlapping rather than fundamentally distinct 
categories, despite the frequent claims of commentators to the contrary . ... [E]ven those 
aspects of antidiscrimination Jaw that are not in fact accommodation requirements in the 
sense just described are similar to accommodation requirements in respects that have not 
previously been understood. "). 
26. See id. at 645, 686-87; see a lso Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination, 
Accommodation and Universal Mandates -Aren't They All the Same?, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 111, 125-26 (2003) ("Title VII ... bans employers from refusing to hire male 
candidates for a flight attendant position, even when the employer contends that the policy 
is driven by monetary considerations of aligning the profile of the flight attendant with 
customer preferences. Even where it is profitable, however, employers must refrain from 
engaging in sex discrimination .... This duty to incur costs to avoid Title VII liability 
resembles the costs employers incur accommodating certain groups under accommodation 
mandates. In both cases, employers must abandon the profit maximizing calculus in favor of 
inclusion of members of protected groups. ") (footnote omitted). 
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employment decisions based on statistically accurate generalizations 
about a protected class.27 
Both the traditional and the revisionist accounts of the differences 
between Title I and Title VII focus, however, on the quantitative or 
monetary costs that each statute imposes on employers.28 What both 
sides of this debate miss, and what the duty to mitigate issue helps 
highlight, is that considering solely quantitative or monetary costs 
overlooks one of the most important differences between Title I and 
Title VII: that Title l's reasonable accommodation provision and Title 
VIl's prohibition on intentional discrimination attribute different 
moral or normative weight to the costs that they impose on employers. 
Title VII's disparate treatment jurisprudence accords no moral or 
normative weight to the costs that an employer may incur from hiring 
members of a protected class; it operates on the assumption that these 
costs give an employer no legitimate cause for complaint. Title VII 
recognizes no valid justification, including cost, for employment 
decisions based on race or color. The statute identifies one situation 
where employers can legitimately make employment decisions based 
27. See Jolls, supra note 25, at 645, 686-87; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational 
Discrimination, " Accommodation , and the Politics of (Disability ) Civil Righ ts, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 825, 832 (2003) ("(A]ccommodation requirements represent nothing more than a 
specific example of the general prohibition of rational discrimination-a prohibition that is 
well entrenched in the Jaw (including Title VII]. "); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination , 
Stigma, and "Disability, " 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 457 (2000) (hereinafter Bagenstos, 
Subordination ] ("(D]iscrimination on the basis of the forbidden classifications is frequently 
rational for the discriminator, but the civil rights laws (including Title VII] prohibit it 
anyway. ") (footnote omitted); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 833, 846 (2001) ("Title VII sometimes permits cost-saving statistical discrimination 
and sometimes forbids it: When it forbids it, I believe it is demanding accommodation. "). 
In addition, Title VII prevents an employer from using a facially-neutral policy that has 
a disparate impact on a protected class if the employer "fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity, " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000), or if the plaintiff "show[s] that other 
selection devices without a similar discriminatory effect would also serve the employer's 
legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship," Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Jolls, supra note 25, at 
652-66. 
28. See, e.g. , Jolls, supra note 25, at 685-86 ("The point is the way in which prohibitions 
on discrimination based upon customer or coworker attitudes or upon correct employer 
beliefs about a particular group impose financial costs on employers, much as do 
accommodation requirements."); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 22, at 24 ("(A]n 
efficiency rationale . . . cannot explain the ADA's requirement of reasonable 
accommodation. The signal from a genuine disability is not wholly spurious. . . . An 
individual who is limited in a 'major life activity' might well be limited in some aspect of a 
given job. Less obviously, even if many disabled workers would not be limited with respect 
to a particular job, employers still might incur higher costs to accurately assess the 
productivity of the disabled than other applicants for employment. Even before the passage 
of the ADA, some employers found such expenditures to be profitable and hired the 
disabled, but it hardly follows, after the enactment of the ADA, that all employers now find 
such expenditures to be profitable. If the innovations required by the ADA were generally 
efficient, they would have been more widely adopted without its enactment.") (footnote 
omitted). 
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on religion, sex, or national origin, namely, "those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise."29 But as the Supreme Court has 
emphasized, this is a singular,30 and "extremely narrow exception,"31 in 
which cost is not a valid reason for refusing to employ a protected 
person. "The extra cost of employing members of one sex," for 
instance, is not sufficient to defend sex-based hiring practices under 
Title VII.32 Title VII's prohibition on intentional discrimination may 
impose costs on employers, as the revisionists note, but the Title VII 
jurisprudence assumes that this gives employers no rightful ground for 
complaint because these costs reflect the moral and normative goals of 
the statute. 
In contrast, Title I's reasonable accommodation provision 
recognizes that employers can have legitimate grounds to complain 
about the costs of accommodation, that these are costs that employers 
can legitimately seek to minimize, and that efforts to minimize the 
costs of accommodation are not merely a form of prejudice.33 This is 
an important difference, and it suggests a powerful reason to impose a 
duty to mitigate on people asking for reasonable accommodation 
under Title I. One strong reason that people seeking the protection of 
Title I's reasonable accommodation provision should have a duty to 
mitigate is that employers can legitimately expect employees and job 
applicants to m1mmize the difficulty and expense of the 
accommodations that the employees and applicants require. As the 
statute recognizes, employers have a legitimate interest in reducing 
these costs. 
If the duty to mitigate issue helps cast light on the debate over the 
differences between Title I and Title VII, a second debate in the Title 
I scholarship casts light back on the duty to mitigate question. This 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (emphasis added). 
30. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 242 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
("Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into 
account in making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a 'bona fide 
occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of th[e] 
particular business or enterprise.' The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is 
that, in all other circumstances, a person's gender may not be considered in making decisions 
that affect her.") (citation omitted). 
31. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 334 (1977); see a lso VA W v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 201 (1991) ("The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has 
read it narrowly."). 
32. Johnson Controls, Inc. , 499 U. S. at 210. 
33. Title I also prohibits intentional discrimination against a disabled job applicant or 
employee who can perform the job in question as it is currently structured. See 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(a) (2000). Like Title VII, Title I assumes that an employer has no legitimate cause to 
complain about the costs of abandoning intentional discrimination. See infra text 
accompanying notes 168-75, 184. 
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second debate revolves around whether Title I's reasonable 
accommodation provision has had negative employment effects on 
disabled people, meaning that the costs that the reasonable 
accommodation prov1s1on imposes on employers have made 
employers less willing to hire disabled people than the employers were 
before Title I was enacted. There is at least some evidence to support 
the view that Title I's reasonable accommodation provision has had 
negative employment effects, although the issue remains contested.34 
If Title I's reasonable accommodation provision has had negative 
employment effects, then imposing a duty to mitigate on disabled 
people seeking reasonable accommodation, which might seem to 
disadvantage disabled people, could actually help them by reducing 
the costs that employing disabled people places on employers and thus 
increasing employers' willingness to hire the disabled. Imposing a duty 
to mitigate could also help disabled people, even if Title I's reasonable 
accommodation provision has not had negative employment effects. It 
may be the case, for instance, that the enactment of Title I has 
increased employers' willingness to hire disabled people, because 
employers' fears of being sued under the statute for not hiring 
disabled people outweigh their reluctance to assume the costs of 
accommodation. An employer in this position would presumably be 
even more willing to hire disabled people if the cost of accommodating 
them was reduced. 
This Article aims to contribute, then, both to the resolution of a 
hard doctrinal problem and to a deeper understanding of Title I and 
its place within the law of employment discrimination.35 Part I argues 
that the Supreme Court (or, better yet, Congress) should find a duty 
to mitigate under Title I of the ADA. Part II explains why this 
obligation should take the specific form of a duty of reasonable 
mitigation. The duty of reasonable mitigation I propose would require 
Title I plaintiffs to undertake those mitigating measures that could 
34. See infra note 63. 
35. I take as a starting point the fact that the ADA exists and is being enforced. I do not 
consider whether the ADA should have been enacted, whether the ADA should now be 
repealed, or how the ADA would compare to a social insurance scheme. For commentary 
discussing those questions, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 494 (1992) ("The ADA fares no better 
than other forms of antidiscrimination laws, and perhaps worse. It too should be repealed, 
whether or not some subsidy for disabled persons is retained. "); Ruth Colker, The Death of 
Section 504, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 219 (2001 /2002) ("The passage of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a significant and positive development for the law of 
disability discrimination.") (footnote omitted); Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 231 (1994) ("I agree, therefore, with Richard Epstein that the 
ADA is a deeply-flawed statute. I do not, however, agree that the remedy is repeal. Or, to 
put the matter more precisely, I do not agree that we should return to a regime in which our 
disability policy consists entirely of pensioning people out of the work force and providing 
some extremely modest efforts at increasing the supply of 'able' workers through 
rehabilitation, vocational counseling, and the like."). 
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reduce their need for accommodation and that would be undertaken 
by a reasonable person in the same situation-meaning, at the least, a 
reasonable person with the same condition, the same mitigating 
measures available, and the same financial resources for treatment. 
This duty would reject both of the extreme positions that currently 
dominate the lower court opinions considering the duty to mitigate. 
One set of these opinions finds no duty to mitigate, while the other 
generally suggests that Title I plaintiffs are obligated to mitigate 
whenever mitigation is possible. In contrast, the duty of reasonable 
mitigation that I advocate would be limited to mitigation that could 
reduce a plaintiff's need for accommodation because this is the 
mitigation that could serve an employer's legitimate interest in 
minimizing the expense and difficulty that can be associated with 
providing accommodation. If mitigation could not lessen a plaintiff's 
need for accommodation, either because the plaintiff already requires 
no accommodation or because the mitigation could not have a large 
enough impact on the plaintiff's disability, the duty of reasonable 
mitigation would not require the plaintiff to mitigate. The duty of 
reasonable mitigation would also be limited to mitigation that a 
reasonable person in the same situation would undertake because 
plaintiffs can have legitimate cause not to mitigate in some 
circumstances. The duty of reasonable mitigation would obligate a 
Title I plaintiff to assume only those risks and side effects that a 
reasonable person would assume to eliminate or ameliorate the 
condition in question, to follow only those measures to improve 
overall health that a reasonable person with the same condition would 
follow, and to shoulder only those financial costs associated with 
mitigation that a reasonable person with the same financial means 
would shoulder. Courts should not find the standard of reasonable 
mitigation too difficult to administer because judges and juries have 
significant experience with applying similar standards of reasonable 
mitigation in many legal contexts, including cases about torts, workers' 
compensation, Social Security .disability benefits, and private disability 
insurance policies. 
Requiring plaintiffs to undertake reasonable mitigation should 
resolve the vast bulk of Title I cases raising the duty to mitigate issue. I 
also contend, moreover, that the reasonable mitigation standard can 
appropriately resolve two particularly hard categories of cases. The 
first involves disabled people who do not want to assume a serious risk 
or side effect associated with mitigation that a reasonable person in 
the same situation would assume. The second involves the small 
number of disabled people who do not mitigate even when a 
reasonable person would because they understand their disability to 
be central to their cultural identity. Both cases involve disabled people 
who have made unreasonable decisions against mitigation in situations 
where reasonable mitigation would involve particularly significant 
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sacrifices, at least from the perspective of the disabled person in 
question. I conclude, however, that disabled people in these difficult 
situations should still be subject to the duty of reasonable mitigation. 
The same arguments for imposing a duty to mitigate on other Title I 
plaintiffs apply here as well. And establishing a separate legal 
standard, outside of the reasonable mitigation standard, to govern 
these hard cases would foster endless disputes about when each of the 
two standards should apply. 
Yet these difficult categories of cases illustrate that judges and 
juries should proceed cautiously before concluding that a plaintiff's 
decision against mitigation is unreasonable. Empirical data about the 
behavior of other disabled people in the plaintiff's situation is an 
important source of information that fact finders can rely upon in 
making the judgment that a plaintiff has acted unreasonably. The 
more disabled people in the plaintiff's situation who decide to 
mitigate, the more evidence there is that mitigation is the only 
reasonable choice. At the same time, the fact that most people in a 
certain situation have mitigated should not always compel the 
conclusion that the people who make the other decision are 
unreasonable. In some situations, the sacrifice associated with 
mitigation may be large enough, or the costs and benefits of mitigation 
sufficiently matched, that decisions both for and against mitigation are 
reasonable, even if a majority of people in the plaintiff's situation 
choose to mitigate. For this reason, courts should not automatically 
and immediately equate reasonableness with majority rule. It is worth 
the effort for courts to evaluate the reasonableness of a plaintiff's 
conduct carefully, considering to the extent possible not only how 
many people in the plaintiff's situation have mitigated or not, but why 
they have acted as well. A more cautious approach would help 
safeguard a plaintiff's most important legitimate interests, justifying its 
somewhat greater demands on the capacity of fact finders. 
Part III briefly examines the legal rights of people who have 
mitigated in light of the duty of reasonable mitigation that I advocate 
imposing. It argues that the duty to mitigate should be paired with 
greater protections for mitigators. For obvious reasons, a person who 
remains substantially limited in a major life activity even after 
reasonable mitigation is protected under Title I and entitled to 
reasonable accommodations. This person has taken reasonable efforts 
to minimize his need for accommodation, but is still disabled and in 
potential need of accommodation. I argue, however, that a plaintiff 
should also be protected from intentional discrimination (although not 
entitled to accommodation) as a "regarded as" disabled person under 
Title I if he has no substantial limitations after mitigating, but suffers 
an adverse employment action because he had to mitigate or because 
of the (non-substantially-limiting) side effects of the mitigation. 
Protecting these two classes of mitigators from intentional 
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discrimination would advance legitimate interests under Title I, 
without impinging upon the legitimate interests of employers. 
Part IV uses the duty to mitigate issue to illuminate a key 
difference between Title I and Title VII. It argues that Title VII 
should impose no duty to mitigate, despite the advantages of placing 
such an obligation on people seeking the protection of Title l's 
reasonable accommodation provision. Placing a duty to mitigate on 
Title VII plaintiffs-which the Title VII jurisprudence formally does 
not do but arguably might be doing indirectly-would allow employers 
to avoid costs that reflect the very bias the statute seeks to condemn. 
But imposing a duty to mitigate on plaintiffs seeking the protection of 
Title l's accommodation provision would serve what the statute 
recognizes as legitimate interests. 
I. THE CASE FOR IMPOSING A DUTY TO MITIGATE ON PLAINTIFFS 
SEEKING THE PROTECTION OF TITLE I'S REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION PROVISION 
The first question to ask in thinking about the duty to mitigate 
issue under Title I is whether Title I establishes such a duty. If Title l's 
statutory text answers that question, the status of the duty to mitigate 
is settled. If the text is unclear, one needs to look elsewhere for 
guidance. As we will see, the case for imposing a duty to mitigate on 
plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title l's reasonable 
accommodation provision focuses on policy considerations because 
the statutory text is indeterminate on the issue of mitigation. 
The ADA defines " 'disability"' as "(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment. "36 Title I defines a 
" 'qualified individual with a disability"' as "an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the employment position."37 Title I 
prohibits intentional employment discrimination "against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability."38 It also entitles a 
qualified disabled job applicant or employee to "reasonable 
accommodations" that alter a job so that the disabled person can 
perform it,39 unless the employer can establish that those 
36. 42 u.s.c. § 12102(2). 
37. Id. § 12111(8). 
38. Id. § 12112(a). 
39. Id. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(9). 
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accommodations "would impose an undue hardship" on the 
employer.40 
This statutory scheme does not indicate whether there is a duty to 
mitigate. Consider, for example, the job applicant described in the 
introduction who needs work equipment for the visually impaired 
because his vision is severely limited, and he has refused an operation 
that could allow him to see much more clearly.41 This applicant would 
certainly count as disabled if he needed equipment for the visually 
impaired because his severely limited eyesight could not be treated. 
This applicant would certainly not count as disabled if he needed 
equipment for the visually impaired because he had made an arbitrary 
decision to wear a blindfold despite having fully functional vision. In 
fact, however, this applicant cannot see clearly by simply removing a 
blindfold, but he can do something to see clearly. Title I's text just 
does not address whether he has an obligation to reduce or eliminate 
his disability if he can. It is similarly silent on the obligations of a 
plaintiff who could control her diabetes much more effectively if she 
lost weight, exercised, modified her diet, and had surgery to combat 
the deterioration of her vision,42 or a plaintiff who could control his 
manic depression much more effectively if he took lithium and 
underwent psychological counseling.43 
Faced with this textual indeterminacy, some of the few lower 
courts and commentators to consider whether Title I imposes a duty to 
40. Id. § 12112(b )(5)(A). 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
42. See, e.g. , Marion J. Franz et al., Nutrition Principles for the Management of Diabetes 
and Related Complications, 17 DIABETES CARE 490, 491 (1994) ("For obese persons with 
type II diabetes mellitus, moderate weight loss irrespective of starting weight has been 
shown to reduce hyperglycemia, dyslipidemia, and hypertension. "); J6hannes Kari 
Kristinsson, Diabetic Retinopathy: Screening and Prevention of Blindness, 75 ACTA 
OPHTHALMOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 1, 9 (Supp. 1997) ("In recent years laser treatment has 
been introduced that can significantly decrease the likelihood of blindness in diabetic 
patients, if the eyes are treated at the appropriate stage of the disease. "); Madelyn L. 
Wheeler, Nutrition Management and Physical Activity as Treatments for Diabetes, 26 
PRIMARY CARE 857, 857 (1999) ("Diabetes is essentially a self-management disease. For 
people with type 1 diabetes, nutrition and physical activity recommendations are integrated 
with blood glucose monitoring and an insulin regimen. For people with type 2 diabetes, this 
means integrating blood glucose monitoring with nonpharmacological therapy (nutrition 
management and physical activity). If necessary, pharmacologic therapy (oral agents or 
insulin) enters into the equation also. "); Shelby R. Wilkes, Current Therapy of Diabetic 
Retinopathy: Laser and Vitreoretinal Surgery, 85 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 841, 846 (1993) ("The 
advent of laser surgery and pars plana vitreous surgery has enhanced the vision and 
improved the lifestyle of the diabetic patient."); supra text accompanying note 11. 
43. See, e.g. , Margaret M. Rea et al., Family -Focused Treatment Versus Individual 
Treatment for Bipolar Disorder: Results of a Randomi zed Clinical Trial, 71 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 482, 482 (2003) ("Results suggest that family psychoeducational 
treatment is a useful adjunct to pharmacotherapy in decreasing the risk of relapse and 
hospitalization frequently associated with bipolar disorder."); infra text accompanying notes 
78-85. 
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mitigate have attempted to resolve the issue by extrapolating from an 
argument about the ADA's text that appeared in a Supreme Court 
opinion, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. ,44 on another issue. But this 
effort is unconvincing. 
Sutton and two companion cases decided in 1999 considered the 
status of Title I plaintiffs who have mitigated their disabilities.45 The 
duty to mitigate was not at issue in Sutton, and none of the Sutton 
opinions addressed it, because the Sutton plaintiffs had already 
mitigated. These plaintiffs had severe myopia, but they wore 
corrective lenses that allowed them to see 20/20 or better.46 They sued 
United Airlines under Title I after the airline refused to hire them as 
commercial airline pilots because they could not satisfy the airline's 
requirement that its pilots have uncorrected vision of 20/100 or 
better.47 The Sutton case raised the question of whether the plaintiffs 
counted as disabled or "regarded as" disabled people now that they 
had mitigated. The Court held that if a plaintiff is no longer 
substantially limited in any major life activity after mitigating, she does 
not count as a disabled person for purposes of Title 1.48 Sutton also 
held that a plaintiff is not protected under Title I as someone who is 
"regarded as" disabled unless she can demonstrate that the employer­
defendant acted because it thought that the plaintiff had an 
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.49 On this 
holding, the Sutton plaintiffs were not protected under Title I because 
their sight was not substantially limited with the corrective lenses that 
they wore in place and because there was insufficient evidence that 
United Airlines thought that the plaintiffs were substantially limited.50 
One argument that the Sutton Court made in reaching its 
conclusions contended that the use of the present tense in the ADA's 
definition of disability, where "the phrase 'substantially limits' appears 
in the Act in the present indicative verb form,"51 helped establish that 
a plaintiff who has mitigated should be evaluated in her current, 
mitigated state for purposes of determining whether she is a disabled 
44. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
45. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
46. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. 
47. See id. at 475-76. 
48. See id. at 475, 482, 488; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521. 
Sutton holds that an individual does count as a disabled person under Title I "if, 
notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, th(e] individual is substantially limited in a 
major life activity." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488. 
49. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521-22. 
50. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-93. 
51. Id. at 482. 
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person covered under Title I.52 Some lower courts53 and 
commentators54 have extrapolated from this part of Sutton to assert 
52. See id. at 482-83. 
53. See Nawrot v. CPC Int'J, 277 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[I]n applying the statute 
to specific impairments, courts may consider only the limitations of an individual that persist 
after taking into account mitigation measures . . . .  This is not, however, license for courts to 
meander in 'would, could, or should-have' land. We consider only the measures actually 
taken and consequences that actually follow. C f  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-84 .... Those who 
discriminate take their victims as they find them."); Williams v. Thresholds, Inc., No. 02 C 
9101, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2003) ("Threshold argues that because Williams 
could have taken prednisone, and that in fact when he later took prednisone he felt much 
better, he was not disabled for ADA purposes. This misconstrues Sutton . The Sutton court 
explicitly stated that courts should not engage in counter-factual hypothesizing, guessing 
whether a course of treatment would have alleviated a plaintiff's disability.") (citation 
omitted); Bertinetti v. Joy Mining Mach., 231 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833-34 (S.D. Ill. 2002) ("[T]he 
defendant urges the Court to consider that Bertinetti's condition might have been improved 
if he had utilized additional corrective devices. Sutton, however, does not give courts a 
license to 'meander in 'would, could, or should-have' land.' Courts should only consider 
mitigating steps actually taken and the consequences that actually followed. Accordingly, 
this court will not speculate about what Bertinetti's condition would be if he had taken 
additional steps to improve his condition.") (citations omitted); Capizzi v. County of Placer, 
135 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001) ("The conclusion that a failure to mitigate does 
not defeat the cause of action is supported by Sutton. There the Court observed that in the 
ADA 'the phrase 'substantially limits' appears . . .  in the present indicative verb form, ... 
[indicating that] the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently-not 
potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability.' It 
should follow from the fact that the question of disability addresses plaintiff's current 
condition, that the fact that a particular procedure would mitigate the condition cannot 
prevent a finding that the plaintiff is presently disabled, though it might effect the damages 
awarded upon a finding of liability.") (citation omitted); Finical v. Collections Unlimited, 
Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037-38 (D. Ariz. 1999) ("Defendant asserts that, when mitigating 
measures are considered, Plaintiff does not have a disability as defined by the ADA ... This 
argument fails because the Supreme Court requires a case-by-case analysis of the limitations 
an individual faces in his or her current state."). 
54. See Debra Burke & Malcolm Abel, Ameliorating Medication and ADA Protection : 
Use It and Lose It or Re fuse It and Lose It?, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 785, 811 (2001) ("[T]he 
Supreme Court concluded in Sutton that the present indicative verb tense used by Congress 
required an individualized inquiry into the actual, not hypothetical, situation of the plaintiff's 
condition with respect to the issue of an impairment substantially limiting a major life 
activity. Considering how a plaintiff would fare if he or she employed mitigating measures 
requires speculation and the consideration of a hypothetical situation, an approach 
seemingly rejected by the Court in Sutton.") (footnote omitted); Joshua C. Dickinson, Will 
the Supreme Court Allow Employers to Consider Reasonable Mitigating Measures Not 
Presently Utili zed by Employees When Determining Whether a "Disability " E xists Under 
Section A of the ADA?, 68 UMKC L. REV. 389, 398-99 (2000) ("One thing seems evident 
from the trilogy of cases ... ; it is the actual condition that the employee presents herself in 
at the time of consideration which is pertinent to the disability inquiry . . . .  [T]he Court 
placed great emphasis on evaluating the individual in their present state and not some 
potential or hypothetical state."); Stephanie A Fishman, Note, Individuals with Disabilities 
but Without Mitigating Measures, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 2013, 2033 (2000) ("According to 
Sutton, a plaintiff is not to be viewed hypothetically but in her present state, with or without 
mitigating measures, to determine whether an impairment is in fact substantially limiting. 
Following the literal reasoning in Sutton, however, a plaintiff suffering from an impairment 
such as myopia, who did not utilize any corrective devices at the time of the alleged 
discrimination, would also be disabled under the ADA because she is currently substantially 
limited in the major life activity of seeing. ") (footnotes omitted); Sarah Shaw, Comment, 
Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who Do Not Use A vailable 
Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1981, 2007 (2002) ("[T]he same 
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that Title I imposes no duty to mitigate because the use of the present 
tense in the ADA's definition of disability establishes that Title I 
plaintiffs are to be evaluated based on their current abilities and 
limitations, whether they have mitigated or not. There are a number of 
reasons to reject this contention, however. 
First, even if one wanted to use the present tense in the ADA's 
definition of disability to resolve the duty to mitigate issue, one could 
not. Suppose that the use of the present tense in the definition of 
disability conclusively establishes that Title I plaintiffs are to be 
evaluated in their present state. That still would not establish how 
courts are to determine a plaintiff's present state. What is the present 
condition of a person who has not mitigated but could? Is he simply 
someone who is disabled? Or is he best described as someone who is 
presently not pursuing reasonable efforts to lessen or eliminate his 
disability? 
Second, the text suggests no reason to think that one should use 
the present tense in the ADA's definition of disability to resolve the 
duty to mitigate issue. There is no indication in the statute that the 
issue of mitigation should be decided by examining the definition of 
disability. It is also hard to characterize Congress as making an 
important choice in its decision to use the present tense in defining 
disability because it is impossible to imagine Congress using any tense 
but the present there. Congress could not have defined disability in the 
future tense of "will substantially limit" because that definition would 
have necessarily relied on speculation and frequently focused on 
irrelevant information. A definition of disability that used the past 
tense of "substantially limited" would have similarly missed vital 
information, because a plaintiff's present state is always relevant, 
regardless of whether there is a duty to mitigate. Consider, for 
reasoning that supported the Court's conclusion that mitigating measures must be 
considered when an individual is currently using such measures demands the opposite 
conclusion with regard to an individual who is not presently using mitigating measures. As 
emphasized by the Court, the plain language of the statute indicates that an individual's 
impairment should be evaluated in its present state rather than in a hypothetical state where 
it 'might, could, or would' be substantially limiting.") (footnote omitted); Christine M. 
Tomko, Note, The Economically Disadvantaged and the ADA: Why Economic Need Should 
Factor into the Mitigating Measures Disability Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1033, 1043 
(2002) ("Furthermore, in explaining its decision, the Court stated that 'a person must be 
presently-not potentially or hypothetically- substantially limited in order to demonstrate 
a disability. A disability exists only where an impairment substantially limits, not where it 
'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.' 
By extension, disability must also exist where the impairment substantially limits the plaintiff 
because he cannot afford to take mitigating measures, not where the impairment 'might not,' 
'could not,' or 'would not' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures could be taken.'') 
(footnote omitted); see also Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 27, at 496 ("The Court's 
conclusion seems entirely sound, both as a matter of basic statutory interpretation and as a 
means of implementing an antisubordination principle. Showing off its facility with 
grammatical categories, the Sutton Court noted one crucial textual point: '[T]he phrase 
'substantially limits' appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form."'). 
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instance, two plaintiffs who have both mitigated, but one still has 
substantial limitations and the other does not. Clearly, that present 
difference is relevant in determining each plaintiff's rights now that 
each has mitigated. The first plaintiff, for example, has a much better 
claim to reasonable accommodations because he still has substantial 
limitations.ss 
In addition, the interpretation of the AD A's definition of disability 
that some lower courts and commentators have adopted would lead to 
absurd results if applied to the duty to mitigate issue. Imagine, as these 
courts and commentators would, that the use of the present tense in 
the ADA's definition of disability establishes that plaintiffs who have 
mitigated are to be evaluated in their mitigated state, and also 
establishes that plaintiffs who have not mitigated are to be evaluated 
based on their current abilities and limitations without bearing any 
duty to mitigate. On this reading of the statute, Title I would treat 
some disabled people more favorably because they have not mitigated 
and would accordingly give some disabled people an incentive not to 
mitigate their disabilities when they otherwise would. Let's return to 
the Sutton plaintiffs, for example. On the reading of Title I that some 
lower courts and commentators have adopted, the Sutton plaintiffs 
should have rationally opted to discard their corrective lenses before 
applying to United Airlines. Discarding their lenses would have meant 
that courts would have been required to evaluate the Sutton plaintiffs 
in their unmitigated condition and to grant the plaintiffs Title I 
protection because their unmitigated eyesight is substantially limited. 
Coverage under Title I, in tum, would have given the Sutton plaintiffs 
the right, if they were otherwise qualified for the pilot positions they 
sought, to demand reasonable accommodations from United Airlines, 
accommodations that might have been the same corrective lenses that 
the Court deemed to have mitigated the plaintiffs' disability.s6 The 
interpretation of the ADA's definition of disability that some lower 
courts and commentators have extrapolated from Sutton would create 
the absurd situation where a plaintiff could be better off demanding 
mitigation as an ADA remedy from an employer rather than 
mitigating herself. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
refused to interpret statutory texts literally, even when the texts were 
55. See infra text accompanying notes 166-70. 
56. Of course, establishing that one is covered under Title I is not the same as proving 
that a particular defendant has violated the statute. Even if the Sutton plaintiffs had 
established their right to demand reasonable accommodation, United Airlines would not 
have had to provide the accommodation if it could "demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business." 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). United Airlines might have been able to defend its uncorrected 
vision requirement for commercial airline pilots under this standard. See infra text 
accompanying note 171. 
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clear, if literalism would produce absurd results.57 In this case, the 
argument for embracing an absurd result is far weaker because the 
text on which the lower courts and commentators have relied is not 
clear. 
With Title I's statutory text indeterminate on the issue of 
mitigation, the case for imposing a duty to mitigate turns on policy 
considerations. The strongest argument for placing a duty to mitigate 
on plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I's reasonable 
accommodation provision is that employers can legitimately expect 
employees and job applicants to attempt to lessen or eliminate their 
need for accommodation if doing so is both possible and (as 
elaborated in Part II) reasonable. Phrased another way, plaintiffs 
should not be entitled to accommodation under Title I if they have 
refused to avail themselves of reasonable treatment options. As Title I 
recognizes, employers have a legitimate interest in minimizing the 
"significant difficulty or expense" .  that can be associated with 
providing accommodations.58 In indicating how a court is to assess 
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on an 
employer, the statute specifically states that a court should consider 
the "cost of the accommodation needed," "the effect on expenses and 
resources," and "the impact . . .  of such accommodation upon the 
operation of the facility."59 
In fact, there are many reasons to believe that it is legitimate to 
seek to minimize the costs of the accommodations that employers 
provide under Title I, and that employers' concerns about these costs 
cannot be dismissed as a form of bias. Title I contemplates 
accommodations ranging from "making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 
disabilities" to "job restructuring, part-time or modified work 
57. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) ("Acceptance of the 
Government's new-found reading of § 692 'would produce an absurd and unjust result which 
Congress could not have intended."') (citation omitted); United States v. X-Citement Video, 
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) ("Some applications of respondents' position would produce 
results that were not merely odd, but positively absurd .. .. We do not assume that Congress, 
in passing laws, intended such results."); Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 
U.S. 440, 454 (1989) ("Where the literal reading of a statutory term would 'compel an odd 
result,' we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper 
scope.") (citation omitted); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989) 
("The Rule's plain language commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant in a civil trial 
as well as in a criminal trial. But that literal reading would compel an odd result in a case like 
this .... No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation 
that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary's testimony that it 
grants to a civil defendant .... It is unfathomable why a civil plaintiff - but not a civil 
defendant - should be subjected to this risk. Thus we agree with the Seventh Circuit that as 
far as civil trials are concerned, Rule 609(a)(l) 'can't mean what it says."') (citation 
omitted). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 
59. Id. § 12111(10)(B). 
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schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or 
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the 
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations. "60 Providing these sorts of accommodations clearly 
imposes substantial and quantifiable costs on employers in some cases, 
even if debate necessarily persists over the exact magnitude of the 
imposed costs because systematic and representative data is 
unavailable. The President's Committee on Employment of People 
with Disabilities, for instance, surveyed a sample of the employers 
who contacted its Job Accommodation Network seeking information 
about accommodations between July 1 994 and June 1995. This survey 
found that 10% of the 448 reported accommodations cost between 
$501 and $1000, 4 % of the accommodations cost between $1001 and 
$1500, 4% of the accommodations cost between $1501 and $2000, 9% 
of the accommodations cost between $2001 and $5000, and 4 % of the 
accommodations cost more than $5000.61 A study of Sears, Roebuck 
from January 1993 to December 1995 found that 10% of the 7 1  
accommodations the company provided had direct costs of between 
$100 and $499, and 1 % of the accommodations had direct costs of 
between $500 and $1000.62 
The costs that Title I's reasonable accommodation provision 
imposes on employers may also be distributed unevenly between 
employers. Title I does not operate like a tax system, in which each 
employer shares the social cost of helping the disabled by paying 
according to a rubric applied to many employers. If more disabled job 
applicants choose to apply to one employer, that employer may 
ultimately bear more accommodation costs than an otherwise identical 
competitor. 
The duty of reasonable mitigation would mean that before an 
employer has to accommodate someone-to make changes and to 
bear costs-that person has to mitigate his disability-to make 
changes and to bear costs-to the extent that this is possible and 
reasonable. With this duty in place, employers would have to 
accommodate only those disabled people who either cannot change in 
ways that could lessen their need for accommodations or have a good 
reason not to change. 
60. Id. § 12111(9). 
61. See President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, Report to 
Congress on the Job Accommodation Network 1, 3, 7 (July 26, 1996) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
62 See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT: TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS, 
ROEBUCK AND CO. 17 fig.I (1996). 
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The debate about the possible negative employment effects 
associated with Title l's reasonable accommodation prov1s1on 
suggests, moreover, that disabled people could also importantly 
benefit from a measure that lessened the cost of accommodation.63 
63. See supra text accompanying note 34. For arguments that Title l's reasonable 
accommodation provision has had negative employment effects, see Daron Acemoglu & 
Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?: The Case of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 916-17 (2001) ("The empirical analysis looks at 
the employment and wages of disabled and nondisabled workers using data from the March 
Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1988-97 . . . . The CP S data show a post-ADA decline 
in the relative employment of disabled men and women aged 21-39, with no change in 
relative wages. The deterioration in the relative employment position of disabled workers 
began in 1993 for men and in 1992 for women, the first two years the ADA was in effect. 
The results are unchanged by controlling for pre-ADA trends in employment of the disabled 
or for the increase in the fraction of people receiving disability insurance and supplemental 
security income (SSI). Together these findings lead us to conclude that the ADA reduced 
employment for disabled workers aged 21-39."); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and 
Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 711  
(2000) ("A main goal of  the ADA is to increase labor market opportunities for people with 
disabilities through its mandate for employer-provided job accommodation and its 
antidiscrimination measures. Although the ADA may have increased job accommodation 
for and reduced discrimination against people with disabilities, the costs of complying with 
the act were large enough to reduce the demand for disabled workers and undo its intended 
effects. This paper shows that the enactment of the ADA led to a decrease of 7.2 percentage 
points in their relative employment. Moreover, these relative employment declines began as 
early as 1990, the year of enactment, and continued to fall through 1995."); id. ("These 
results strongly suggest that the employment mandates of the ADA that require firms to 
provide job accommodation to all of their disabled workers were an ineffective way to 
increase labor market opportunities for people with disabilities. In particular, the results 
suggest that these mandates made it more costly for firms to employ people with disabilities, 
and, consequently, their employment fell."); CHRISTINE JOLLS & J.J. PRESCOTT, 
DISAGGREGATING EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: THE CASE OF DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION 4 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10740, 2004) ("We 
estimate that in the years just after its enactment the ADA produced approximately a 10 
percent decline in disabled employment in states in which the law's reasonable 
accommodations requirement was an innovation, compared to states in which a similar 
requirement existed at the state level prior to the ADA's enactment. By contrast, we 
consistently find little to no effect of the AD A's enactment on disabled employment in states 
in which the law's traditional antidiscrirnination prohibition, with its associated firing costs, 
was an innovation, compared to states with similar preexisting prohibitions. Our results 
therefore suggest that the reasonable accommodations requirement of the ADA, rather than 
its imposition of firing costs, played the central role in the ADA's near-term employment 
effects."). For criticism of the contention that Title l's reasonable accommodation provision 
has had negative employment effects, see Peter Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of the 
ADA 's Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 289 (2003) ("[E]xisting 
research provides little basis on which policymakers can make informed decisions regarding 
how the ADA has impacted ADA-qualified individuals."); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, 
Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL 31, 31 (2003) 
("Studies finding a negative effect of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on the 
employment of people with disabilities have used the work disability measure, which has 
several potential problems in measuring employment trends. Using Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) data that permit alternative measures of disability, this study 
finds decreased employment among those reporting work disabilities in the first few years 
after the ADA was passed but increased employment when using a more probably 
appropriate measure of ADA coverage (functional and activity limitations that do not 
prevent work)."); Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
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Reducing the cost of providing accommodation could increase 
employers' willingness to hire disabled people. And augmenting 
employers' willingness to hire disabled people is probably a surer 
route to employment for more disabled people than relying on 
litigation against recalcitrant employers, especially given the mounting 
evidence that only a very small percentage of Title I suits result in 
favorable judgments for the plaintiffs.64 
Title I's statutory text may be indeterminate on the issue of 
mitigation, but there are good reasons to impose such a duty. Part II 
considers the form that the duty to mitigate under Title I should take. 
II. THE DUTY OF REASONABLE MITIGATION 
Establishing that there should be a duty to mitigate under Title I 
does not settle the equally important questions about when that duty 
should apply, what standard courts should use to enforce the duty, and 
what evidence should be relevant. Let us turn now to the practical, 
doctrinal issue of how Title I's duty to mitigate should be structured. 
The small number of lower court opinions to consider the duty to 
mitigate under Title I are divided on the question of whether the duty 
should exist and have advanced no systematic way of thinking about 
when the duty should apply. The opinions that reject the duty to 
mitigate rely on the (unconvincing) argument about the present tense 
in the ADA's definition of disability.65 The lower court opinions that 
endorse a duty to mitigate, in turn, have not established any clear 
rubric for implementing it. To the extent that these decisions imply 
any standard for when the duty to mitigate should apply, most appear 
to suggest that Title I plaintiffs are under a duty to mitigate whenever 
LAB. L. 271, 303 (2000) ("[A]ttribution of disemployment results to the ADA is 
premature."). 
64. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) ("[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three 
percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial 
court level. Of those cases that are appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of 
reported cases. These results are worse than results found in comparable areas of the law; 
only prisoner rights cases fare as poorly.") (footnotes omitted); Study Finds Employers Win 
Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998) ("The American Bar Association's (ABA's) 
Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law .... decided to analyze all the ADA 
employment cases covered in the Reporter to determine the exact percentages of employer 
and employee victories in such cases. The primary result . . . revealed that employers 
prevailed in approximately 92 percent of the final case decisions-meaning cases that have 
gone through the appeals process or have not been overturned on appeal as of March 31, 
1998--thus contradicting the public perception that employers were more heavily burdened 
by ADA Title I. This 92 percent figure is consistent with the results of an analysis of the 
EEOC's statistics for administrative complaints, which reveals that employers prevail in 86 
percent of the administrative complaints resolved by the EEOC."). 
65. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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mitigation is possible. One recent United States District Court 
opinion, for instance, states that "[w]here a person's impairment can 
be treated and symptoms alleviated by mitigating factors such as 
medication or treatments, such medications or treatments must be 
taken into account in determining disability."66 "The Court cannot 
permit [the plaintiff] to create a physical disability by failing to pursue 
treatment options."67 A second district court opinion holds that a 
plaintiff is not protected under Title I because her "asthma is 
correctable by medication," and she has not corrected it.68 A third 
declares that " [a] plaintiff who does not avail himself of corrective 
medication is not a qualified individual under the ADA."69 A few 
other decisions seem to understand the duty to mitigate in more 
limited terms, but none articulates a standard for when that duty 
should apply. For example, one district court opinion notes in denying 
a plaintiff Title I protection that the plaintiff has failed to take "a 
reasonable measure" to mitigate. The opinion, however, does not 
explore or explain the suggestion that the duty to mitigate might 
66. Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
67. Id. 
68. Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000), affd, 230 
F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000) (mem.). 
69. Hewitt v. Akan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); see 
also Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Hill further 
argues that the drowsiness caused by taking hypertension medication in combination with 
the pain relievers prescribed for her work-related injuries was an ADA disability . .. .  [W]e 
find no evidence in the record that Hill 's physical condition compelled her to take a 
combination of medications that persistently affected her ability in 1995 to stay awake on the 
job. Therefore, she failed to present sufficient evidence that this alleged physical impairment 
substantially limited her major life activity of working."); Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ. 
7393 (AKH), slip op. at 7-8 ( S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003) ("Since plaintiff had medication 
available to her, and knew that she could function normally if she took it, she cannot be said 
to have been substantially impaired if she neglected to avail herself of such corrective 
measures . ... Plaintiff's failure to take advantage of mitigating measures does not make her 
a qualified individual under the ADA."); Mont-Ros v. City of West Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d 
1338, 1356-57 ( S.D. Fla. 2000) ("[B]ecause Plaintiff's sleep apnea condition is treatable and 
can be corrected with the use of a CPAP machine at night, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that 
he is 'substantially limited in a major life activity."'); Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. 
Supp. 2d 1225, 1232-33 (D. Kan. 1999) ("[P]laintiff has conceded that on both occasions 
when he had seizures at work, he was not taking Dilantin, which was prescribed to reduce 
the chance of a seizure. The Supreme Court has recently held that if a disorder can be 
controlled by medication or other corrective measures, it does not substantially limit a major 
life activity. Although the facts indicate that taking Dilantin will not necessarily eliminate 
seizures, it would make it far less likely that he would have seizures. Plaintiff does not 
address this issue.") (citation omitted); Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937 F. Supp. 
541, 548 (E.D. Va. 1996) ("Dr. Wittenburg found in April 1993 that, with treatment, 
Roberts' depression should not affect his work performance. And it is undisputed that 
several of Roberts' supervisors urged him to seek treatment, which he refused to do for a 
period of more than fourteen months . ...  Roberts' refusal to seek the recommended and 
available treatment precludes him from being a 'qualified individual with a disability' under 
the ADA. "). 
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require plaintiffs to pursue only reasonable forms of mitigation.70 
Similarly, another district court opinion suggests that the relevant 
question might be whether the plaintiff's "alleged disability was easily 
correctable," without elaborating on the suggestion or indicating what 
the "easily" standard might mean.71 
Part II's core proposal is that plaintiffs seeking Title I protection 
should bear a duty of reasonable mitigation, a duty to undertake those 
mitigating measures that could reduce their need for workplace 
accommodation and that would be undertaken by a reasonable person 
in the same situation-meaning, at the least, a reasonable person with 
the same impairment, the same mitigating measures available, and the 
same financial resources for mitigation. The justification for excluding 
measures that could not lessen the plaintiff's accommodation 
requirements from the duty to mitigate should be clear from the 
previous discussion. A crucial reason to impose a duty to mitigate is to 
ease the burden that providing accommodations can place on 
employers. Mitigation cannot serve that function if it cannot diminish 
a plaintiff's need for accommodation-either because the plaintiff 
already requires no accommodation or because the mitigation cannot 
have a large enough impact on the plaintiff's disability. 
Section A explains why the duty to mitigate should be a duty of 
reasonable mitigation, outlining the strengths of this core proposal and 
describing how it would work with reference to the three major 
categories of reasons why disabled people do not mitigate. This 
Section argues that disabled people can have legitimate grounds for 
not mitigating in some circumstances, so that it would be 
inappropriate to require Title I plaintiffs to mitigate whenever 
mitigation could reduce their need for accommodation. It also 
contends that the reasonable mitigation standard has important 
advantages over a number of other possible standards for when the 
duty to mitigate should apply, like a standard requiring mitigation 
whenever mitigation is not too risky for the plaintiff, or a standard 
requiring mitigation that is not overly difficult for the plaintiff, or a 
standard requiring mitigation that is financially affordable for the 
plaintiff, or a standard requiring mitigation that costs less than what 
the defendant would bear in accommodating the plaintiff. A 
reasonable mitigation standard is more universal than a standard that 
only considers risk or difficulty or expense, and courts can employ the 
reasonable mitigation standard to evaluate the many different reasons 
why a plaintiff might not mitigate. A duty of reasonable mitigation 
also advances the ADA's explicit commitment to combating disabled 
70. Rose v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614, 617 (D. Md. 2002). 
71. Llante v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 3091, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
12, 1999). 
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people's isolation and segregation. Courts should have relatively little 
difficulty administering the duty of reasonable mitigation because 
judges and juries already have substantial experience in applying 
similar reasonable mitigation requirements to many legal settings, 
including cases about torts, workers' compensation, Social Security 
disability benefits, and private disability insurance policies. 
Imposing a duty of reasonable mitigation should resolve the vast 
bulk of Title I cases that raise the duty to mitigate issue. I contend, 
moreover, that the reasonableness standard provides an appropriate 
way of handling two particularly hard categories of cases. The first 
involves plaintiffs who do not want to assume risks or side effects that 
a reasonable person would assume, but that are serious nonetheless. 
The second involves the small number of disabled people, mostly deaf, 
who do not want to mitigate their disabilities even if a reasonable 
person would because they believe that these disabilities are central to 
their cultural identity. These two cases are discussed separately in 
Section B. 
A. Core Cases 
The reasonable mitigation standard provides an appropriate and 
administrable way of dealing with the three major reasons why 
disabled people do not mitigate: the risks or side effects associated 
with mitigation, the difficulties of maintaining high levels of overall 
health, and the financial costs associated with mitigation. This Section 
will first discuss why it would be inappropriate to demand that all 
disabled people who are not mitigating for one of these three reasons 
mitigate as a condition of Title I protection. It will then explore the 
benefits of applying a standard of reasonable mitigation to these 
situations, as opposed to a number of other possible standards, and 
explain how the reasonableness standard would work. 
Consider why Title I should not deny protection to all of the 
plaintiffs who are not mitigating because of risks or side effects 
associated with mitigation. The risks and side effects that can come· 
with mitigation range widely in seriousness and appear in two main 
varieties, each of which dissuades some disabled people from 
mitigating. First, there is the risk that the mitigation will not work, and 
that attempting the mitigation will cost the person time, suffering, 
money, or worsened health and functioning. In cochlear implant 
surgery, for instance, a surgeon implants a device in the inner ear of a 
deaf person that is meant to enable the person to understand oral 
communication.72 But there are dangers associated with the 
72. See, e.g. , Michael F. Dorman, An Overview of Cochlear Implants, in COCHLEAR 
IMPLANTS: A H ANDBOOK 5, 5-6 (Bonnie Poitras Tucker ed., 1998). 
November 2004) Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act 241 
implantation procedure itself,73 and some people who receive cochlear 
implants, including almost all adults who were deaf at birth, still 
cannot process sound sufficiently well to comprehend speech.74 The 
surgery, moreover, often damages and sometimes destroys any 
residual hearing that the person has.75 
73. See, e.g. , Noel L. Cohen & Ronald A. Hoffman, Complications of Cochlear Implant 
Surgery in Adults and Children, 100 ANNALS 0TOLOGY, RHINOLOGY & LARYNGOLOGY 
708, 708 (1991) ("Surgery for cochlear prosthesis insertion exposes the patient to several 
potential risks . . . .  Major complications usually have to do with surgical technique and 
include flap necrosis, improper electrode placement, and rare facial nerve problems. Minor 
complications include dehiscence of incisions, infection, facial nerve stimulation, dizziness, 
and pedestal problems with the Ineraid device. "); id. at 711 ("Although life-threatening 
complications are extremely rare, the devastating effects of major flap breakdown, facial 
palsy, or incorrect electrode placement cannot be underestimated. Major flap breakdown 
leads to device contamination and the need for intravenous antibiotics and/or surgical 
revision. Multiple operations are sometimes required. The trauma of facial paralysis is well 
known to all otolaryngologists. Faulty electrode placement results in lack of auditory 
response, a particularly devastating outcome for a patient anticipating hearing restoration. 
Patients suffer physically, financially, and psychologically."); Robert C. Wang et al., 
Cochlear Implant Flap Complications, 99 ANNALS 0TOLOGY, RHINOLOGY & 
LARYNGOLOGY 791, 791 (1990) ("In a series of 52 patients who received cochlear implants, 
4 patients suffered flap complications (7.7%). "); Philip J. Hilts, Drug Agency Is Studying Ear 
Implants' Links to Meningitis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at A7, A7 (reporting that "(t)he 
Food and Drug Administration is investigating what appears to be an increase in meningitis 
among deaf patients who have had tiny devices called cochlear implants surgically inserted 
deep inside their ears to help them hear "). 
74. See, e.g. , Dorman, supra note 72, at 19-20 ("Tests conducted in several countries 
indicate, overwhelmingly, that patients who were deafened at birth and who were implanted 
as adults obtain little speech understanding by means of an implant. Of all the patients 
reported in the literature, only a few individuals achieve speech understanding scores at a 
level above chance. "). 
75. See, e.g., William J. Boggess et al., Loss of Residual Hearing After Cochlear 
Implantation, 99 LARYNGOSCOPE 1002, 1004 (1989) ("The findings indicate a significant 
downward shift in the hearing thresholds of the implanted ear following the insertion of a 
25-mm electrode array. Although some patients demonstrated smaller shifts than others, the 
shift is still great enough to be considered clinically significant (greater than 5 dB) for all 
patients at one or more frequencies for the implanted ear. These findings are consistent with 
the previous clinical reports . . . .  Dye reported that 20% of single-channel cochlear implant 
recipients had a loss of residual hearing attributable to the implant. All of those patients 
received an older, long electrode. Rizer, et al. found that each of their six patients who 
received a long multichannel electrode and the one reported patient who received a short 
single-channel electrode, showed a loss of residual hearing. "); Bernard Fraysse et al., 
Cochlear Implan ts for Adults Obtaining Marginal Benefit from Acoustic Amplification: A 
European Study, 19 AM. J. OTOLOGY 591, 594-95 (1998) ("The comparison of thresholds 
showed that for all subjects, independent of the surgical technique used, a clinically 
significant downward shift in unaided hearing thresholds was observed for the implant ear 
after surgery with changes of ;?10-dB HL observed for at least one of the speech 
frequencies. "); Th. Klenzner et al., Does Depth of Electrode Insertion Influence Inner Ear 
Function in Cochlear Implant Patients?, in 1 4TH EUROPEAN CONGRESS OF 0TO-RHINO­
LARYNGOLOGY HEAD AND NECK SURGERY 43, 43 (Klaus Jahnke & Markus Fischer eds., 
2000) ("Damage of inner ear function could be caused by the insertion of cochlear implant 
(CI) electrodes. In the literature the possibility of preserving residual hearing is estimated at 
about 50%.") (citation omitted); Henryk Skar:Zyllski et al., Preservation of Residual Hearing 
in Children and Post-Lingually Deafened Adults After Cochlear Implantation: An Initial 
Study, 64 ORL 247, 251 (2002) (reporting that "5 of 26 patients (19%) lost some residual 
hearing " and "5 of 26 (19%) patients lost all measurable residual hearing after cochlear 
implantation "). 
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Second, there is the risk that even if the mitigation does work, in 
the sense of accomplishing what it was supposed to, it may have 
undesirable or dangerous side effects. Some common adverse features 
of mitigation are the pain and convalescence period that can follow 
surgery,76 and the time and effort consumed by complying with a 
treatment regime that may require repeated medical visits or multiple 
doses of medication each day.77 In addition, many mitigating measures 
have severe side effects. Lithium, for example, is the leading 
medication for the treatment of bipolar disorder.78 But people with 
bipolar disorder often stop taking lithium because of its side effects,79 
76. See, e.g. , D. Janet Pavlin et al., Pain as a Factor Complicating Recovery and 
Discharge After Ambulatory Surgery, 95 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 627, 627, 630 (2002) 
("Pain is the most common medical cause of delayed recovery and discharge after 
ambulatory surgery . . . .  The present study demonstrates the relevance of pain as a factor 
complicating the recovery and discharge of patients after ambulatory surgery. Nineteen 
percent of patients reported severe pain after surgery (pain score ?.7 on a 10-point scale)."). 
77. See, e.g. , S.P. Conway et al., Compliance with Treatment in Adult Patients with Cystic 
Fibrosis, 51 THORAX 29, 30-31 (1996) ("The degree of effort and time needed for adherence 
to prescriptions for nebulised antibiotics, dietary supplements and inhaled bronchodilators 
accounted for 60%, 41 %, and 41 % of missed doses, respectively. Respondents gave more 
than twice as many reasons for not doing physiotherapy as for any other treatment studied. 
The major reasons for omitting physiotherapy were the time and commitment it demands 
(44%) . . . .  "); Seth A. Eisen et al., The Effect of Prescribed Daily Dose Frequency on Patient 
Medication Compliance, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1881, 1881 (1990) ("The objective 
of this study was to determine the relationship between prescribed daily dose frequency and 
patient medication compliance. The medication compliance of 105 patients receiving 
antihypertensive medications was monitored by analyzing data obtained from special pill 
containers that electronically record the date and time of medication removal. .. . 
Compliance was defined as the percent of days during which the prescribed number of doses 
were removed. Compliance improved from 59.0% on a three-time daily regimen to 83.6% 
on a once-daily regimen. Thus, compliance improves dramatically as prescribed dose 
frequency decreases. Probably the single most important action that health care 
professionals can take to improve compliance is to select medications that permit the lowest 
daily prescribed dose frequency. "). 
78. See, e.g. , Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patien ts with 
Bipolar Disorder, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 5 ( Supp. Dec. 1994); Trevor Silverstone & 
Sarah Romans, Long Term Treatment of Bipolar Disorder, 51 DRUGS 367, 367-68, 370 
(1996). 
79. See, e.g. , Js;;rgen Aagaard & Per Vestergaard, Predictors of Outcome in Prophylactic 
Lithium Treatment: A 2-Year Prospective Study, 18 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 259, 260-61, 
264 (1990) ("133 patients participated in the study . .. .  The non-adherent group was defined 
as those 56 ( 42.1 % ) patients who stopped treatment at least once within the first 2 years. 
None of these patients were medically advised to stop . . . .  The most frequent reason given 
by the patient to stop treatment was side effects .... "); Kay R. Jamison et al., Patient and 
Physician Attitudes Toward Lithium: Relationship to Compliance, 36 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 866, 869 (1979) ("Approximately one half of our patients reported 
discontinuing lithium treatment against medical advice at least once. "); id. at 868 ("From the 
patient's perspective, the most important reasons for noncompliance were (1) they were 
bothered by the idea that their moods were controlled by a medication; (2) they were 
bothered by the idea of having a chronic illness, symbolized by the necessity of lithium 
therapy, and (3) side effects (particularly lethargy, decreased coordination, and dulling of 
senses). Those patients who reported actually discontinuing lithium were significantly more 
likely to also report 'missing highs' and the hassle of taking medications as important reasons 
for noncompliance. "); Mario Maj et al., Long-Term Outcome of Lithium Prophyla xis in 
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which can include impaired memory and cognitive functioning,80 
tremors,81 hypothyroidism,82 weight gain,83 birth defects,84 and a loss of 
Bipolar Disorder: A 5-Year Prospective Study of 402 Patients at a Lithium Clinic, 155 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 30, 30, 32 (1998) ("Of the 402 enrolled patients, 27.9% were no longer taking 
lithium at follow-up . . . .  Of the 1 12 interviewed patients who were not taking lithium at 
follow-up, 95 (84.8%) had interrupted prophylaxis on their own initiative. The alleged main 
reason for interruption of medication was its perceived inefficacy in 35 cases, trouble related 
to side effects in 27, the conviction that the patient was cured and needed no more drugs in 
17, the annoyance of taking medicines in 11, and loss of energy or productivity in five."); A.J. 
Mander, ls Lithium Justified After One Manic Episode?, 73 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA 
SCANDINAVICA 60, 66 (1986) ("The life table analysis clearly indicates that lithium, if taken 
continuously and, presumably, for life, will significantly reduce the risk of relapse. However, 
many patients take their lithium for a limited time only, [so that] the outcome of the group 
that the clinicians intended to treat [with lithium] is not different from the control group."); 
id. ("Most patients are only in their 3rd or 4th decade after their first admission for mania. 
They are unlikely to view the prospect of long-term prophylaxis with much enthusiasm, 
especially with the possibility of serious side effects, which include tremor, renal problems 
and the risk of accidental intoxication. It is not surprising therefore that they quickly 
discontinue it. "). 
80. See, e.g. , ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION: A CONCISE, 
NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO THE ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOACTIVE 
DRUGS 316 (rev. ed. 2001) ("Chronic lithium therapy is accompanied by adverse effects on 
memory and cognitive functioning. Some researchers report improvements in motor 
performance, cognition, and creative ability after lithium withdrawal, implying detrimental 
effects of lithium in these areas during drug therapy."); Michael J. Gitlin et al., Maintenance 
Lithium Treatment: Side Effects and Compliance, 50 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 127, 130 
(1989) ("[P]atients indicated that they perceived cognitive changes and weight gain as more 
troublesome and more likely to provoke lithium noncompliance. This observation was 
demonstrated by two findings: (1) the five side effects most likely to cause noncompliance 
were cognitive and weight symptoms; and (2) patients who self-reported lithium 
discontinuation perceived themselves as having greater cognitive side effects in general­
and mental slowness specifically-compared with patients who reported never having 
stopped lithium treatment. "). 
81. See, e.g. , DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 805-06 
(4th ed., text rev. 2000). 
82 See, e.g. , THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 967 
(Robert E. Hales et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) ("Hypothyroidism may occur in as many as 20% of 
patients treated with lithium.") (citations omitted); Rose Salata & Irwin Klein, Effects of 
Lithium on the Endocrine System: A Review, 110  J. LABORATORY & CLINICAL MED. 130, 
131 (1987) ("On the average, 5% to 15% of patients given long-term lithium treatment are 
reported to show clinical signs or chemical evidence of hypothyroidism."). 
83. See, e.g. , Y. Chen & T. Silverstone, Lithium and Weight Gain, 5 INT'L CLINICAL 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 217, 217 (1990) ("We found 14 studies concerning the clinical use 
of lithium in which data on weight were given. Weight gain was reported to have occurred in 
1 1  % to 65% of the patients studied. Among 100 patients taking lithium continuously for 1-2 
years, 11 gained more than 5 kg and subsequent weight reduction was said to be difficult. ") 
(citations omitted); P. Vestergaard et al., Prospective Studies on a Lithium Cohort: 3. 
Tremor, Weight Gain, Diarrhea, Psychological Complaints, 78 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA 
SCANDINAVICA 434, 436 (1988) ("The body weight rose in 73% of the patients [taking 
lithium], fell in 18% and remained constant in 9%. A weight gain of 10 kg or more was seen 
in 21 % of the patients, of 20 kg or more in 2%."). 
84. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 316 ("Lithium possesses a degree of teratogenic 
potential, especially to the heart of the developing fetus."); Silverstone & Romans, supra 
note 78, at 373 ("[L]ithium is not advised during pregnancy, particularly in the first trimester, 
as the risk of fetal malformation involving the cardiovascular system (Ebstein's anomaly) is 
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the heightened creativity, mental concentration, and productivity that 
can be associated with mania.85 Similarly, electroconvulsive therapy is 
one of the most effective treatments for major depression, yet it 
commonly results in memory loss.86 There are also a variety of drugs 
available to treat depression, but they can have side effects that 
include cognitive and memory impairment,87 seizures,88 blurred 
vision,89 sedation,90 sleep disturbances,91 sexual dysfunction,92 weight 
gain,93 and the risk of death if a person takes the antidepressants with 
certain foods and medicines.94 Similarly, antiepileptic medications can 
cause interference with learning ability,95 aggressive behavior,96 
greater in the children of women prescribed this drug during pregnancy than that of women 
not so exposed."). 
85. For an eloquent account of this loss, see KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET 
MIND 5-6 (1995) ("My manias, at least in their early and mild forms, were absolutely 
intoxicating states that gave rise to great personal pleasure, an incomparable flow of 
thoughts, and a ceaseless energy that allowed the translation of new ideas into papers and 
projects. "); id. at 91-92 ("Even though I was a clinician and a scientist, and even though I 
could read the research literature and see the inevitable, bleak consequences of not taking 
lithium, I for many years after my initial diagnosis was reluctant to take my medications as 
prescribed . . . .  It was difficult to give up the high flights of mind and mood, even though the 
depressions that inevitably followed nearly cost me my life . . . .  When I am my present 
'normal' self, I am far removed from when I have been my liveliest, most productive, most 
intense, most outgoing and effervescent."). 
86. See, e.g. , Keith G. Rasmussen et al., Electroconvulsive Therapy and Newer 
Modalities for the Treatment of Medication-Refractory Mental Illness, 77 MAYO CLINIC 
PROC. 552, 553-54 (2002); id. at 554 ("Electroconvulsive therapy-induced memory 
impairment takes 3 forms. The first is posttreatment confusion .... The second type of 
memory impairment with ECT is anterograde amnesia .... the inability to recall information 
learned after the treatments have begun . . .. The third and most bothersome type of ECT­
induced memory impairment is retrograde amnesia, forgetting things that happened before 
the course of treatments . ...  Usually, only a few events, such as conversations, are forgotten, 
but patients occasionally forget most of the events of this period. Additionally, patients 
sometimes have sporadic episodes of forgetting personal life events that happened several 
years before treatment. Some of the forgotten events may never be remembered. "). 
87. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290-91, 296; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 749-
50, 1106, 1111, 1344, 1347, 1682-83, 2676, 2679 (57th ed. 2003). 
88. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 
87, at 1682-83. 
89. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 
87, at 749-50, 1106, 1108-09. 
90. See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290, 293, 301; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, 
supra note 87, at 1106, 1111, 1603, 1607, 2562-63, 2627. 
91. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293, 297; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra 
note 87, at 1603, 1607, 1682, 1685-86, 2562-63. 
92. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293-94, 297-98; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, 
supra note 87, at 749-50, 1232, 1236, 1344, 1346, 1603, 1607, 2562-63, 2676, 2678-79. 
93. See, e.g. , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 749-50, 1232, 1236, 2562-
63. 
94. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 302-03; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra 
note 87, at 2562. 
95. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 96-97. 
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hyperactivity,97 blood disorders,98 liver damage,99 abnormal vision, 100 
weight gain,101 and birth defects.102 Haldol can help control the 
symptoms of Tourette's syndrome, but it can also have a number of 
side effects, including tardive dyskinesia, a potentially permanent 
condition that causes the muscles in a person's face and body to spasm 
and twitch involuntarily.103 Moreover, Haldol can slow thought, curtail 
creative inspiration and expression, and-in the words of one person 
with Tourette's who decided to take the drug only during the work 
week-make a person '"sober, solid, [and] square.'"104 
If Title I plaintiffs were required to assume any risk and bear any 
side effect associated with mitigation that could reduce their need for 
accommodation, that would mean that they would have to endanger 
96. See, e.g. , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 2906-07. 
97. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 96. 
98. See, e.g., id. at 96-97; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 421-22, 425, 
3249-50. 
99. See, e.g. , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 421-23, 433, 3249-50. 
100. See, e.g. , id. at 2565-67. 
101. See, e.g. , Jouko LT. Isojarvi et al., Obesity and Endocrine Disorders in Women 
Taking Valproate for Epilepsy, 39 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 579, 582 (1996) ("More than half of 
our patients taking valproate were obese, and the average increase in body weight in the 11 
women (50% of the subjects on valproate) experiencing an indisputable weight gain was 21 
kg. These findings are in accordance with previous reports of weight gain in 44 to 57% of 
patients treated with valproate. Therefore, obesity seems to be a common and in some cases, 
a very severe adverse effect of valproate treatment.") (citations omitted). 
102. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 98; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 
87, at 421-23, 433. 
103. See, e.g. , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 2464-65. 
104. OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK H IS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER 
CLINICAL TALES 95 (1985) (quoting Ray, a patient); see also id. at 96 ('"You 'normals', who 
have the right transmitters in the right places at the right times in your brains, have all 
feelings, all styles, available all the time - gravity, levity, whatever is appropriate. We 
Touretters don't: we are forced into levity by our Tourette's and forced into gravity when we 
take haldol. You are free, you have a natural balance: we must make the best of an artificial 
balance."' (quoting Ray)). 
There is also the risk of something that might be considered a less obvious side effect of 
mitigation: that the use of the mitigating device or process will itself be stigmatic. Some 
disabled people avoid using mitigating measures that make their disability more apparent in 
an effort to avoid this stigma. For instance, some people will walk with great difficulty and 
pain to avoid using a wheelchair, or will greatly limit their daily movements to avoid using a 
walker. See, e.g. , DENNIS BYRD & MICHAEL D'ORSO, RISE AND WALK: THE TRIAL AND 
TRIUMPH OF DENNIS BYRD 240 (1993); STEVE FIFFER, THREE QUARTERS, Two DIMES, 
AND A NICKEL: A MEMOIR OF BECOMING WHOLE 263 (1999); ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE 
BODY SILENT 61, 92-93 (1987); S. Kay Toombs, Sufficient unto the Day: A Life with Multiple 
Sclerosis, in CHRONIC ILLNESS: FROM EXPERIENCE TO POLICY 3, 18 ( S. Kay Toombs et al. 
eds., 1995). Some people will not use a white cane because they do not want to reveal their 
blindness. See, e.g. , STEPHEN KUUSISTO, PLANET OF THE BLIND 65, 100 (1998); Jacobus 
tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 
841, 903 (1966). Some people will leave their mental illnesses untreated so that they do not 
have to identify themselves as mentally ill. See, e.g. , JAMISON, supra note 85, at 54; see also 
Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
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themselves, no matter the probability of benefit. As we have seen, the 
dangers associated with mitigation can be substantial, and mitigating 
measures with high failure rates or serious side effects may have a 
relatively small chance of causing a notable improvement in the 
plaintiff's overall condition. Requiring plaintiffs to assume any risk 
and bear any side effect would also be massively inefficient, as it 
would encourage plaintiffs to expend significant efforts on activities 
unlikely to make them more prepared for employment. A person who 
undertakes a mitigating measure that has a large risk of failure or that 
brings substantial side effects may often do little to enhance his ability 
to work and may instead simply replace a biological impairment with a 
medically induced one. 
It would be similarly inappropriate to exclude plaintiffs from Title 
I protection because they do not maintain extremely high levels of 
overall health as a means of mitigation. While even able-bodied 
Americans frequently have trouble sustaining high standards of 
general health,105 some physical and mental impairments make general 
health maintenance especially difficult. Exercise may be arduous or 
impossible given some impairments.106 Weight gain is a common side 
effect of many of the drugs designed to mitigate various disabilities.107 
Studies suggest that smoking, which is much more common among the 
mentally ill than in the general population, 108 can alleviate the 
105. See, e.g. , Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., State-Specific Prevalence of Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults - United 
States, 2002, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1277 ,  1277 (2004) ("Cigarette 
smoking in the United States causes serious illnesses among an estimated 8.6 million persons 
and approximately 440,000 deaths annually . .. .  ") (footnote omitted); id. at 1278 ("During 
2002, the median prevalence of current smoking in the 50 states and DC was 23.1 % (range: 
12.7 % [Utah]-32.6% [Kentucky]).") (citation omitted); Katherine M. Flegal et al., 
Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999-2000, 288 JAMA 1723, 1723 
(2002) ("[A] [s]urvey of 4115 adult men and women conducted in 1999 and 2000 as part of 
the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), a nationally 
representative sample of the US population .... [found that] [t]he age-adjusted prevalence 
of obesity was 30.5% in 1999-2000 compared with 22.9% in [a nationally representative 
survey conducted between 1988 and 1994] .... The prevalence of overweight also increased 
during this period from 55.9% to 64.5% .... "). 
106. See, e.g. , ABLE LIVES: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF PARALYSIS 63 (Jenny Morris ed., 
1989) ("Many were concerned about putting on weight, echoing the problems faced by a lot 
of non-disabled women as they grow older. Most people tend to put on weight as they age, 
but we have the added difficulty of not being able to exercise so easily, and of extra weight 
being more noticeable when you are sitting down."). 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 83, 93, 101. 
108. See, e.g. , Alexander H. Glassman et al., Smoking, Smoking Cessation, and Major 
Depression, 264 JAMA 1546, 1546 (1990) ("We conducted a test of th[e] association 
['between cigarette smoking and major depressive disorder'], employing population-based 
data (n=3213) collected between 1980 and 1983 in the St Louis Epidemiologic Catchment 
Area Survey of the National Institute of Mental Health. A history of regular smoking was 
observed more frequently among individuals who had experienced major depressive 
disorder at some time in their lives than among individuals who had never experienced 
major depression or among individuals with no psychiatric diagnosis. Smokers with major 
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symptoms of various mental illnesses and that some people with 
mental illnesses may use smoking to self-medicate.109 A disability can 
depression were also less successful at their attempts to quit than were either of the 
comparison groups."); id. at 1548 ("A multiple logistic regression showed that the 
relationship between major depression and smoking was independent of age, sex, education, 
marital status, and race . . . . "); John R. Hughes et al., Prevalence of Smoking Amongst 
Psychiatric Outpatients, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 993, 993 (1986) ("The prevalence of 
smoking among psychiatric outpatients (N=277) was significantly higher than among either 
local or national population-based samples (N=l,440 and 17,000) (52% versus 30% and 
33%). The higher prevalence was not associated with the age, sex, marital status, 
socioeconomic status, alcohol use, coffee use, or institutionalization of the psychiatric 
patients. Smoking was especially prevalent among patients with schizophrenia (88%) or 
mania (70%) and among the more severely ill patients."); id. at 995 tbl.2 (reporting the 
smoking rates for patients with major depressive disorder (49%), anxiety disorder (47%), 
personality disorder (46%), and adjustment disorder (45%)); Karen Lasser et al., Smoking 
and Mental Illness: A Population-Based Prevalence Study, 284 JAMA 2606, 2606 (2000) ("[In 
a nationally representative population sample,] [c]urrent smoking rates for respondents with 
no mental illness, lifetime mental illness, and past-month mental illness were 22.5%, 34.8%, 
and 41.0%, respectively. Lifetime smoking rates were 39.1 %, 55.3%, and 59.0%, 
respectively .. . .  Smokers with any history of mental illness had a self-reported quit rate of 
37.1 % . . .  , and smokers with past-month mental illness had a self-reported quit rate of 
30.5% . . .  compared with smokers without mental illness (42.5%) .... Persons with a mental 
disorder in the past month consumed approximately 44.3% of cigarettes smoked by this 
nationally representative sample."); id. at 2607 ("We defined mental illness as major 
depression, bipolar disorder, dysthymia, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, simple 
phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse, alcohol dependence, drug abusr drug 
dependence, antisocial personality, conduct disorder, or nonaffective psychosis. The �atter 
includes schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, delusional 
disorder, and atypical psychosis."); id. at 2608 ("The relationship between smoking and 
mental illness persisted when we controlled for age, sex, and geographic region using logistic 
regression ... . "). 
109. See, e.g. , Glassman, supra note 108, at 1548 ("In a recent examination of 
withdrawal symptoms during the first week following smoking cessation, we observed that, 
among smokers without a history of major depression, symptoms of depression were, in fact, 
rather uncommon and, when they did occur, were generally mild. However, among smokers 
with a history of major depression, depressed mood during withdrawal was very common 
and was associated with failure in smoking cessation efforts."); id. at 1548-49 ("Clinical 
experience suggests that those few depressed smokers who do succeed in stopping are at 
increased risk to develop another episode of major depression. We have seen a number of 
cases in which smokers with a history of major depression who are not depressed at the time 
they try to quit get seriously depressed shortly after giving up cigarettes."); id. at 1549 ("[O]n 
a number of occasions we have seen serious depressions that gradually developed following 
smoking cessation disappear within hours of resuming cigarette smoking. In addition, a 
number of these patients had experienced depressive episodes associated with prior smoking 
cessation attempts. These observations, together with our earlier evidence that these 
smokers frequently develop depressive symptoms when they try to stop, suggest that these 
are causally connected events and that nicotine withdrawal can provoke episodes of major 
depression.") (footnote omitted); Donald C. Goff et al., Cigarette Smoking in Schizophrenia: 
Relationship to Psychopathology and Medication Side Effects, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1189, 
1192-93 (1992) ("Nicotine also improves concentration and decreases distractibility in 
normal subjects evaluated with the Stroop Test. Patients with schizophrenia have been 
shown to be particularly impaired in their performance on this test, raising the possibility 
that schizophrenic smokers may be self-medicating a cognitive deficit. . .. Self-medication of 
more subtle cognitive or affective symptoms during adolescence, before the onset of overt 
psychotic illness, may also contribute to the higher rate of smoking in schizophrenic 
patients.") (citations omitted). 
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also be a source of stress, which may make weight gain110 and 
smoking111 more likely. 
Along the same lines, a duty of mitigation that required disabled 
people to bear any financial cost associated with mitigation, no matter 
their financial resources, would ignore Congress's recognition "that 
people with disabilities, as a group, . . .  are severely disadvantaged 
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally."112 Mitigation 
can sometimes be expensive. For example, glaucoma medication 
needed to preserve vision can cost over $2000 a year.113 A manual 
wheelchair can cost between $500 and $4000, and a motorized 
wheelchair can cost as much as $20,000.114 The cost of a single hearing 
110. See, e.g. , Henry A. Jordan et al., Patterns of Weight Change: The Interval 6 to JO 
Years After Initial Weight Loss in a Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment Program, 57 PSYCHOL. 
REP. 195, 202 (1985) ("The fluctuation in weight over time may suggest, perhaps, that 
patients may experience weight gains during periods of stress. When the stress is alleviated, 
they lose the weight. Motivation for weight control for most of the present patients probably 
waxes and wanes, perhaps in relation to the major events in their lives. Such fluctuations are 
related not only to a commitment to control eating but also to the effort necessary to handle 
both routine and nonroutine life events. "). 
111. See, e.g. , Ovide F. Pomerleau & Cynthia S. Pomerleau, Neuroregulators and the 
Reinforcement of Smoking: Towards a Biobehavioral Explanation, 8 NEUROSCIENCE & 
BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 503, 504 (1984) ("It has been observed that many schedules and 
situations found to be effective in provoking nicotine self-administration might accurately be 
described as stressful. A link between nicotine and stress is also suggested by the findings of 
Schachter and colleagues, who demonstrated that smokers smoke more when anxious or 
when subjected to painful stimulation (e.g., before giving a lecture, during doctoral 
examinations, receiving electric shocks, etc.).") (citations omitted); see also Rose v. Home 
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614 n.7 (D. Md. 2002) ("Rose [who has respiratory 
problems] attempts to explain away his smoking habit as an unavoidable condition, possibly 
even a disability .... He . . . blames his 'smoking addiction ' on stress. He states '[w]hen I am 
undergoing periods of stress, I smoke more. In the past, I have smoked as few as 112 pack of 
cigarettes a day (without Wellbutrin). When I am undergoing stressful periods, I have 
smoked up to two packs of cigarettes a day."'); LIZZIE SIMON, DETOUR: MY BIPOLAR 
ROAD TRIP IN 4-D, at 26 (2002) ("Lithium wasn't the only drug that helped me recover after 
I was diagnosed with manic depression. Eventually I was smoking pot about five times a 
day . . . .  I needed to be high all the time because I couldn't deal with the intensity of what 
had happened to me ... . For me, pot was a bridge back to real life, a cushiony warm soft 
bridge that made the day-to-day OK while my brain and body adjusted to lithium and while 
my soul began to digest the trauma. Also, pot made it easy to be social again after the most 
alienating and horrifying experience of my life."). 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2000). 
113. See, e.g., J. William Doyle et al., Glaucoma Medical Treatment-2002: Does Yearly 
Cost Now Equal the Year?, 79 OPTOMETRY & VISION SCI. 489, 489 (2002). 
114. See, e.g. , Lynn Bryant, Cost of Wheelchairs: Are You Paying Too Much?, ACCENT 
ON LIVING, Fall 1994, at 28, 28; see also Ian Austen, A Leg with a Mind of Its Own, N.Y. 
nMEs, Jan. 3, 2002, at Gl, G4 ("The C-Leg [prosthetic leg], which was introduced to the 
United States market in 1999, costs $40,000 to $50,000, compared with $15,000 for a non­
electronic hydraulic model."). 
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aid can range from approximately $400 to approximately $3000,115 and 
a cochlear implant device can cost approximately $20,000.116 
Not surprisingly, tort jurisprudence indicates that some disabled 
people do not have access to the funds needed for mitigation, 117 and 
that people disabled by tort are not obligated to mitigate if they 
cannot afford the cost of doing so.118 Medicaid and private health 
insurance policies do not always pay for mitigation. For example, 
Medicaid programs in five states do not provide customized 
wheelchairs to adults, and Medicaid programs in six states do not 
provide motorized wheelchairs to adults.119 Medicaid programs in at 
least eighteen states usually or often fail to cover the full cost of a 
cochlear implant device.120 Some private insurance policies also do not 
cover the full cost of a cochlear implant device,121 and most private 
insurance policies do not pay for hearing aids.122 
Forty-five million people in America, moreover, currently have no 
public or private health insurance, often because they are 
unemployed.123 It would be ironic if the duty of mitigation denied 
some disabled people protection against employment discrimination 
because they cannot afford to mitigate, when they cannot afford to 
mitigate because no one will hire them. Even if a disabled person 
managed to undertake mitigation by going into debt, protection under 
Title I is no guarantee of obtaining employment. 
Given that a disabled person's reasons for not mitigating can 
sometimes be legitimate and sometimes not, it would be inappropriate 
115. See, e.g. , Time to Deal with Hearing Loss?, CONSUMER REP. ON HEALTH, May 
2002, at 1, 1. 
116. See, e.g. , J. Robert Wyatt et al., Cost Utility of the Multichannel Cochlear Implant in 
258 Profoundly Deaf Individuals, 106 LARYNGOSCOPE 816, 819 tbl.IV (1996). 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16. 
118. See, e.g. , Fuches v. S.E. S. Co., 459 N.W.2d 642, 643 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) ("[A] 
person may be excused from mitigating damages if they lack sufficient financial resources to 
do so."); Seagers v. Pailet, 656 So. 2d 700, 714 ( La. Ct. App. 1995) ("Failure to undergo 
corrective surgery because the plaintiff cannot monetarily afford to do so is not failure to 
mitigate damages."). 
119. See Esteban v. Cook, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1257 ( S.D. Fla. 1999). 
120. See Steven Garber et al., Payment Under Public and Private Insurance and Access 
to Cochlear Implants, 128 ARCHIVES OTOLARYNGOLOGY-HEAD & NECK SURGERY 1145, 
1150 (2002). 
121. See id. 
122. See Time to Deal with Hearing Loss?, supra note 115, at 1. 
123. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 14 
(2004) ("An estimated 15.6 percent of the population, or 45.0 million people, were without 
health insurance coverage in 2003, up from 15.2 percent and 43.6 million people in 2002."); 
id. at 17 ("Of those 18 to 64 years old in 2003, full-time workers were more likely to be 
covered by health insurance (82.5 percent) than part-time workers (76.2 percent) or 
nonworkers (74.0 percent)."). 
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for the duty to mitigate to demand mitigation whenever it could 
reduce the person's need for accommodation. A rule demanding all 
possible mitigation to lessen accommodation requirements might, in 
its relative absoluteness, have the advantage of relative clarity, but it 
would not take account of the plaintiff's legitimate interests. Yet that 
still does not answer the question of when mitigation should be 
required. A plaintiff seeking the protection of Title I could, for 
example, be obligated to mitigate when mitigation is not too risky for 
the plaintiff, or could be obligated to mitigate when mitigation is not 
overly difficult for the plaintiff, or could be obligated to mitigate when 
mitigation is not too expensive for the plaintiff, or could be obligated 
to mitigate when mitigation costs less than what the defendant would 
bear in accommodating the plaintiff (a "least-cost-avoider" standard). 
A duty of reasonable mitigation would have a number of 
advantages over these other potential standards. First, the reasonable 
mitigation standard is more universal than a standard that looks 
exclusively at risk or difficulty or expense, and it provides courts with 
a means of assessing the many different reasons why a disabled person 
might decide not to mitigate. The duty of reasonable mitigation would 
require a plaintiff seeking Title I protection to undertake those 
mitigating measures that could reduce the plaintiff's need for 
accommodation and that a reasonable person in the same situation 
would undertake. There are a variety of ways to define the "same 
situation," but some clear requirements suggested by the preceding 
discussion of reasons for avoiding mitigation are that the reasonable 
person have the same condition, the same mitigating measures 
available, and the same financial resources for mitigation. This 
reasonable. mitigation standard would mean that a Title I plaintiff 
would be obligated to assume only those risks or side effects that a 
reasonable person would assume to eliminate or improve the 
condition in question, to take only those steps to improve his overall 
health that a reasonable person with the same condition would take, 
and to bear only those costs associated with mitigation that a 
reasonable person with the same financial means would bear. In this 
way, the reasonable mitigation standard would provide some 
assurance that the law is not obligating Title I plaintiffs to subject 
themselves to pointless harm, along with a means of recognizing the 
obstacles to health maintenance that a plaintiff may be experiencing 
and adjusting for what the plaintiff can afford. 
Second, the reasonable mitigation standard advances the ADA's 
goal of combating the "isolat[ion] and segregat[ion]" of disabled 
people.124 A least-cost-avoider standard for applying the duty to 
mitigate would promote the clustering of disabled employees in 
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000). 
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relatively few workplaces-those able to provide accommodations at 
relatively low cost because of their efficiency, economies of scale, 
centralized location, or industry. Plaintiffs suing employers with 
relatively low costs of accommodation would be more likely to win 
Title I protection on the ground that mitigation would be more 
expensive than accommodation; plaintiffs suing employers with 
relatively high costs of accommodation would be more likely to be 
denied Title I protection on the ground that accommodation would be 
more expensive than mitigation. This clustering of disabled 
employees, however, would at least partially frustrate the ADA's 
commitment to the integration of disabled people in the workplace. 
The clustering would also help concentrate the costs that Title I 
imposes on a relatively small group of employers, which would raise 
distributional fairness concerns.125 A least-cost-avoider standard for 
applying the duty to mitigate is not necessary to limit an employer's 
financial liability, moreover. Title I already provides that an employer 
does not have to make an accommodation where it "can demonstrate 
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of [its] business."126 Perhaps more importantly, the duty of 
reasonable mitigation leaves employers with significant flexibility in 
many situations where the cost of mitigation is less than the cost of 
accommodation. Where mitigation would be reasonable but for the 
expense it would impose on the plaintiff, and the defendant-employer 
agrees to bear all or part of that expense, the plaintiff would be 
obligated to mitigate if a reasonable person in the plaintiff's situation, 
faced with whatever expenses remain, would mitigate. 
Third, the reasonable mitigation standard should not be unduly 
difficult for courts to administer because judges and juries have 
substantial experience in applying similar standards of reasonable 
mitigation to many related legal contexts.127 Defendants in common 
law tort actions, for example, frequently contend that the people they 
have disabled by tort have failed to mitigate, and many courts have 
held in these cases that a tort victim's damage award will be reduced if 
he did not undertake mitigating measures that a reasonable person in 
125. See supra Part I. 
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
127. Compared to a least-cost-avoider standard, a duty of reasonable mitigation would 
also make it more possible for disabled people to assess whether they have complied with 
the duty to mitigate and to plan accordingly. The reasonable mitigation standard depends on 
information outside the employer's control, such as information about what other disabled 
people in the same situation have done. See infra text accompanying notes 134-37. A least­
cost-avoider standard, in contrast, depends on the defendant's cost of accommodation, 
information that the employer controls and that only it may know. A disabled person may 
have few ways of determining an employer's cost of accommodation until he requests an 
accommodation, and even then he may not gain access to all the relevant data. 
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the same situation would have undertaken.128 This jurisprudence, in 
tum, evaluates when mitigation is reasonable,129 and when it is not.130 
128. See, e.g. , Stark v. Shell Oil Co., 450 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1971) ("This case is 
governed by Louisiana law. The law of Louisiana is that an injured person must submit to 
reasonable treatment, including an operation if it is shown that the operation will alleviate 
the disability.") (citation omitted); Salas v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 202, 211 (W.D.N.Y. 
1997) ("Under New York law, an injured party has a duty to mitigate her damages, and in 
that regard is required to make a reasonable effort and to act as a reasonable, prudent 
person would under the circumstances."); Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 205 
(Iowa 2001) ("[T]here must be substantial evidence that there was something that the 
plaintiff could do to mitigate his loss and that requiring the plaintiff to do so was reasonable 
under the circumstances. Furthermore, it must be shown that the plaintiff acted 
unreasonably in failing to undertake the mitigating activity.") (citation omitted); Jacobs v. 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 432 So. 2d 843, 845 ( La. 1983) ("[A]n accident victim has a 
duty to exercise reasonable diligence and ordinary care to minimize his damages after the 
injury has been inflicted."); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 531 (Me. 1978) ("There is a 
positive duty upon a person injured through the negligence of another to minimize his 
damages and to use reasonable diligence in securing medical or surgical aid."); Adee v. 
Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. 1979) ("Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages by 
acting reasonably in obtaining treatment for her injury."); Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 
So. 2d 1149, 1162-63 (Miss. 1992) ("Without question, a person injured in tort is required to 
take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages, and this, at the very least, includes giving 
attention to doctor's orders regarding his course of recovery."); Frisnegger v. Gibson, 598 
P.2d 574, 581 (Mont. 1979) ("[T]he trial court . . .  allowed the jury to consider whether 
Frisnegger should have submitted to treatment, including possible surgery, on the 
reasonable person test. Where mitigation of damages is concerned, we have supported the 
reasonable person test or the ordinarily prudent person test in property damage cases. We 
hold that the District Court properly submitted the mitigation issues to the jury on that basis 
here ... . ") (citations omitted); Automatic Merchandisers, Inc. v. Ward, 646 P.2d 553, 554 
(Nev. 1982) (per curiam) ("It is unquestioned that an injured person cannot recover for 
damages which could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care. The doctrine of 
mitigation of damages has been applied to preclude recovery for disability which could have 
been avoided if the plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking medical care, 
including surgical treatment.") (citation omitted); Favier v. Winick, 583 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) ("Generally, a party who claims to have suffered personal injuries by 
reason of the defendant's negligence or other tortious conduct is required to use reasonable 
and proper effort to make the damage as small as practicable, and is not entitled to recover 
for any damage which by the use of such effort might have been avoided.") (citations 
omitted); Dunn v. Maxey, 693 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) ("The law in Ohio 
precludes one who is injured by the tort of another from recovering damages for harm that 
could have been avoided by reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the 
tort."); Zimmerman v. Ausland, 513 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Or. 1973) ("It is equally well 
established that the plaintiff in a personal injury case cannot claim damages for what would 
otherwise be a permanent injury if the permanency of the injury could have been avoided by 
submitting to treatment by a physician, including possible surgery, when a reasonable person 
would do so under the same circumstances."); Yost v. Union R.R. Co., 551 A.2d 317, 322 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("When determining damages for personal injuries in Pennsylvania, it 
is proper for a jury to consider the failure of the plaintiff to undergo surgery or medical 
treatment that an ordinarily prudent man would have submitted to under the circumstances 
in an effort to better his condition."); Cox v. Keg Rests. U.S., Inc., 935 P.2d 1377, 1380 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("An injured party generally may not recover damages proximately 
caused by that person's unreasonable failure to mitigate."); Lobermeier v. Gen. Tel. Co. of 
Wis., 349 N.W.2d 466, 474 (Wis. 1984) ("The question is one of fact for the jury-what was a 
reasonable course of conduct, under the circumstances, to mitigate the injuries or 
damages."). 
129. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1176, 1182 ( La. 1979) ("Dr. Vogel 
opined that at least eighty or ninety percent of the patient's discomfort should be relieved by 
treatment, which would probably include an operation . . . .  We therefore agree that the trial 
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Along the same lines, many courts reviewing the decisions of workers' 
compensation boards have found that a plaintiff seeking compensation 
for a workplace accident has a duty to take reasonable steps to 
mitigate his injury.131 Similarly, many courts reviewing decisions on 
court's award should be amended to eliminate any recovery for permanent loss of earning 
capacity. "); Leaman v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 798 So. 2d 285, 293 (La. Ct. App. 2001) ("[W)e find 
that Cooper's decision not to use a permanent orthodontic retainer or splint recommended 
by her orthodontist, Dr. Marshall Gottsgen, was error. "); Flight Line, Inc. , 608 So. 2d at 
1162-63 (" Substantial evidence reflects Tanksley did not follow doctor's orders and likely 
worsened his injuries as result. On November 4, 1984, he ignored instructions and reinjured 
himself, and it is true this led to his first surgery. Following this first surgery, Tanksley did 
indeed lie about a pinprick test because he was bored at home and thought he should return 
to work and, as a result, Dr. Stringer released him to go back to work to 'light duty' sooner 
than he otherwise would have. After the surgery, he worked difficult, strenuous shifts and 
further aggravated his condition. Without question, a person injured in tort is required to 
take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages, and this, at the very least, includes giving 
attention to doctor's orders regarding his course of recovery. In the relevant posture of the 
case, the Circuit Court was no doubt obliged to accept that Tanksley had failed in this duty, 
that he had in fact aggravated his condition by his own course of conduct. ") (citations 
omitted). 
130. See, e.g. , Stark, 450 F.2d at 998 ("We think that Shell's proof fell far short of 
demonstrating that Stark unreasonably refused to submit to treatment of his back injury. 
Even without weighing the seriousness of the operation proposed by Dr. Purvis, there was 
no showing that that operation offered a reasonable certainty of correcting the disability. 
There was direct medical testimony that it did not. There was also the undisputed evidence 
that an identical operation had already been performed with negative results. "); A utomatic 
Merchandisers, Inc. , 646 P.2d at 555 ("[A)ppellant failed to present evidence that 
respondent's disinclination to undergo surgery was unreasonable . ... [ S)urgery was not even 
consistently recommended prior to trial, and neither Ward's treating physician nor 
appellant's expert witness recommended surgical intervention by the time of trial, since 
respondent's condition had improved with conservative treatment."); Zimmerman, 513 P.2d 
at 1171 ("Neither is there any evidence that plaintiff had been advised by any doctor that she 
should submit to a surgical operation on her knee and that she then failed or refused to do 
so. Indeed, both plaintiff's and defendant's doctors agreed that surgery was not indicated at 
the time of their examination . ... No case has been cited to us in which it has been held that 
a plaintiff with a torn cartilage in the knee must submit to surgery to remove the damaged 
cartilage or be barred, as a matter of law, from seeking damages for an otherwise permanent 
injury, at least in the absence of such evidence."); Cox, 935 P.2d at 1380 ("The Keg first 
argues that Cox's unreasonable failure to mitigate is demonstrated by his refusal to have his 
shunt removed or restructured as recommended by his physiatrist, Dr. Evan Cantini. But 
Cantini only testified that he felt that it might have been useful to consider revising or 
eliminating the shunt and that he discussed shunt revision as a treatment option .. .. 
Moreover, Cantini stated that he was not an expert in evaluating hydrocephalus and 
deferred to Cox's neurosurgeon, Dr. Richard Winn, who testified that it was reasonable to 
decline a shunt revision. "). 
131. See, e.g., Thurman v. Clarke Indus., Inc., 872 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994) 
(en bane) (" Section 11-9-512 provides as follows: 'Except in cases of hernia , which are 
specifically covered by § 11-9-523, where an injured person unreasonably refuses to submit 
to a surgical operation which has been advised by at least two (2) qualified physicians and 
where the recommended operation does not involve unreasonable risk of life or additional 
serious physical impairment, the Commission, in fixing the amount of compensation, may 
take into consideration such refusal to submit to the advised operation."'); Beth-Elkhorn 
Corp. v. Epling, 450 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Ky. 1970) ("KR S 342.035(2) provides, so far as 
pertinent to this case: 'No compensation shall be payable for the * * * disability of an 
employe[e) * * * in so far as his disability is * * "  continued, by an unreasonable failure to 
submit to or follow any competent surgical treatment or medical aid or advice.' "); Veal v. 
Trans Gulf, Inc., 723 So. 2d 987, 992 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam) ("Though the claimant 
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Social Security disability benefits have held that benefits will be 
denied to a claimant with "an impairment that can be remedied by 
treatment with reasonable effort and safety."132 Courts interpreting 
cannot be forced to submit to surgery, his compensation may be jeopardized if he 
unreasonably refuses. "); Gordon v. Me. Reduction Co., 358 A.2d 544, 548 (Me. 1976) (per 
curiam) ("We do not doubt that under 39 M.R.S.A. § 65 a claimant's unreasonable refusal to 
submit to surgery or any reasonable examination attendant thereto is an affirmative defense 
to the employer's obligation to continue to provide compensation benefits ... . ") (footnote 
omitted); Jacobs v. Ryder Sys./Complete Auto Transit, 789 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1990) ("A claimant's refusal to submit to medical treatment bars an award of compensation 
only when the refusal is unreasonable."); Yarns v. Leon Plastics, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 801, 804 
(Neb. 1991) ("[W]hile a disabled employee may not be required to undergo surgery, an 
unreasonable refusal to submit to surgery, taking into account the risk involved to the 
employee, the nature of the surgery, and the likelihood of improving the condition, may 
result in the forfeiture or reduction of compensation benefits, as may be appropriate."); Saif 
Corp. v. Orr, 792 P.2d 454, 456 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) ("A claimant who unreasonably fails or 
refuses to mitigate the extent of his permanent disability is not entitled to compensation for 
that portion of his disability attributable to the unreasonable failure or refusal."); Am. Red 
Cross v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 741 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) ("Section 
306(f.1)(8) of the Workers' Compensation Act ... provides: 'If the employe[e] shall refuse 
reasonable services of health care providers, surgical, medical and hospital services, 
treatment, medicines and supplies, he shall forfeit all rights to compensation for any injury 
or increase in his incapacity shown to have resulted from such refusal."'); Klein Indus. 
Salvage v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 259 N.W.2d 124, 125 (Wis. 1977) (per 
curiam) ("Under the Workers' Compensation Act, a claimant may receive reduced benefits 
or be denied them altogether if he or she fails to mitigate the damages resulting from a 
work-related injury. The statute provides as follows: 'TREATMENT REJECTED BY 
EMPLOYE[E]. Unless the employe[e] shall have elected Christian Science treatment ... , 
no compensation shall be payable for the death or disability of an employe[ e ], if his death be 
caused, or insofar as his disability may be aggravated, caused or continued (a) by an 
unreasonable refusal or neglect to submit to or follow any competent and reasonable 
medical or surgical treatment .... "'). 
132. Johnson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 794 F.2d 1106, 1111 (6th Cir. 1986); 
see also Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) ("If a symptom 
can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling. "); Schena v. 
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 635-F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1980) ('"In determining whether a 
claimant's refusal to undergo treatment is reasonable-i. e. supported by justifiable cause 
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1507-several factors must be considered.' ... A reasonable fear may 
justify the refusal of treatment.") (citation omitted); Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 
(6th Cir. 1978) ("The Secretary's reliance on appellant's refusal to undergo a surgical spinal 
fusion does not support a denial of benefits. Appellant's surgeon testified that it was not 
unreasonable for his patient to decline to submit to this serious surgery.") (citation omitted); 
Nichols v. Califano, 556 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A claimant under a disability need 
not submit to all treatment, no matter how painful, dangerous, or uncertain of success, 
merely because one physician believes that a remedy may be effective. In determining 
whether a claimant's refusal to undergo treatment is reasonable-i. e. , supported by 
justifiable cause under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1507-several factors must be considered. ") (citations 
omitted); Fessler v. Apfel, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1253 (D. Colo. 1998) ("'If an impairment can 
reasonably be treated or controlled it cannot constitute a disability."') (citation omitted); 
Valdez v. Heckler, 616 F. Supp. 933, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("Impairments that can be 
reasonably remedied by treatment cannot function as the basis for a finding of disability."); 
Benedict v. Heckler, 593 F. Supp. 755, 760-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[E]ven if the treatment 
were prescribed and would restore plaintiff's ability to work, plaintiff may still refuse such 
treatment where justifiable cause exists .... The overwhelming majority of cases in this area 
deal with the refusal of surgery. In those cases, doctor's predictions of success, patient's fear 
of pain, or fear of the surgery itself and even the doctor-patient relationship are factors to be 
considered. The refusal, however, must be reasonable.") (citations omitted); Martin v. 
Schweiker, 550 F. Supp. 199, 201 (N.D. Cal. 1982) ("It is well settled that where an 
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private disability insurance policies have also found that some policies 
either explicitly or implicitly condition benefits on the insured's 
pursuit of reasonable mitigation.133 
One piece of evidence that fact finders judging the reasonableness 
of a plaintiff's actions should consider when it is available is what 
other people in the same situation-with the same condition, the same 
available mitigating measures, and the same financial resources-have 
actually done.134 The more people in the plaintiff's situation who have 
mitigated, the stronger the evidence that mitigation is the only 
impairment reasonably can be remedied by treatment, it cannot serve as the basis for 
disability. "); Holguin v. Harris, 480 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("If an impairment 
reasonably can be remedied or controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot serve as a 
basis for a finding of disability."); Fletcher v. Califano, 471 F. Supp. 317, 320 (N.D. Tex. 
1979) ("If an impairment can reasonably be remedied or controlled by treatment, it cannot 
serve as a basis for a finding of disability."); Locklear v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 639, 647 (D. 
Md. 1976) ('"(I)f an impairment reasonably can be remedied by treatment, it can not serve 
as a basis for a finding of disability."') (citation omitted). 
133. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Henry, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1003-
04 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("On apparent first impression in the Ninth Circuit, the Court holds a 
disability insurance policy may condition benefits on the insured's consent to appropriate 
medical care, which may include surgery. . . . (T)he appropriate-care provision (in the 
disability insurance policy) here creates an explicit duty to seek and accept appropriate 
treatment. "); Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 96-3951, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 24, 1997) ("'(P)olicies 335 and 337 ... require that plaintiff be 'receiving care by a 
physician which is appropriate for the condition causing the disability' in order to be entitled 
to benefits .... 'Appropriate' means suitable under the circumstances. It does not mean 
perfect care, or the best possible care. Thus, in order to prove he is entitled to total disability 
under policies # 335 and # 337, the plaintiff must also prove that he has received appropriate 
care for his allegedly disabling condition."' (quoting jury instructions)); Casson v. 
Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 367 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) ("Delaware decisional law is 
aligned with the opposite view-that an insured must submit to treatment to which a 
reasonably prudent man would ordinarily submit if the disability is correctable. If the 
insured fails or refuses to submit to reasonable treatment recommended by competent 
physicians, he is precluded from recovery for the disability for the period the cure would 
have become effective . .. .  I conclude that the duty to minimize a claimed disability is a 
condition precedent to Nationwide 's liability under the contract with plaintiff and that such 
condition was implied in the policy as a matter of law. ") (citations omitted). 
134. Reasonableness is a question for the jury or for the judge acting as a finder of fact, 
unless no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiffs actions were reasonable. See, e.g., 
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 n.12 (1976) ("(T)he jury's unique 
competence in applying the 'reasonable man' standard is thought ordinarily to preclude 
summary judgment in negligence cases. "); Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 34 
(1st Cir. 2003) ("[Even if the] raw facts are undisputed . .. .  the judgment call as to 
reasonableness is itself a jury issue unless no reasonable jury could decide it in the plaintiff's 
favor. "); King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 259 (2d Cir. 1997) ("(T]he assessment of 
reasonableness generally is a factual question to be addressed by the jury."); West v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 868 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("[T]he cases show that 
reasonableness becomes a question of law appropriate for determination on motion for 
summary judgment when only one conclusion about the conduct's reasonableness is 
possible."); Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 703 F.2d 921, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[E)ven 
where there is no dispute as to the facts, it is usually for the jury to decide whether the 
conduct in question meets the reasonable man standard. Issues that require the 
determination of the reasonableness of the acts and conduct of the parties under all the facts 
and circumstances of the case, cannot ordinarily be disposed of by summary judgment.") 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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reasonable choice. Examining this sort of empirical evidence could 
improve consistency between cases and would provide fact finders 
with a firm foundation on which to make their judgments of 
reasonableness. It would also allow reasonableness to be judged with 
some reference to the choices that disabled people themselves have 
made. 
The record of disabled people's own decisions is a valuable source 
of information for at least two reasons. First, disabled people have 
strong incentives to seek out and pursue beneficial mitigating 
measures. The biological and physical disadvantages that can be 
associated with disability are widely (although not universally)135 
acknowledged among the disabled. Many disabled people, with a large 
variety of disabilities, stress these disadvantages and explain that they 
would prefer to be able-bodied for that reason.136 Mitigation can vastly 
increase a person's realistic chances of securing employment. It 
generally makes people more able to work, and many, if not most, 
employers will evaluate employees and job applicants who have 
mitigated in their mitigated state. Mitigation also frequently improves 
the quality of a disabled person's life outside work. Disabled people, 
considered as a group, have powerful motivations to undertake 
reasonable mitigation, although any one disabled individual will not 
necessarily act reasonably. 
135. See supra text accompanying note 19; infra text accompanying notes 140-60. 
136. For instance, Martin Milligan, a blind philosopher, explains that: "Certainly, if 
doctors said there was now a good chance of restoring my sight by an operation, I would be 
actively interested." Letter 4: From Martin Milligan to Bryan Magee, in ON BLINDNESS: 
LETTERS BETWEEN BRYAN MAGEE AND MARTIN MILLIGAN 34, 34-36 (1995). Blindness "is 
so disadvantaging in such a wide range of frequently encountered circumstances that" it 
"would still be a serious handicap even if we blind people constituted the overwhelming 
majority of the world's population, and could arrange things to suit ourselves, and could 
subject the remaining sighted people to our will." Id. at 38. Bonnie Poitras Tucker, a lawyer 
and legclI academic, states that she "would gladly grab any opportunity to fix [her] deafness" 
because " [d]eaf people lack one of the five critical senses, plain and simple." BONNIE 
POITRAS TuCKER, THE FEEL OF SILENCE, at xix, xxi (1995). Jenny Morris, a disability rights 
activist who was paralyzed in an accident, similarly reports "that even if the physical 
environment in which I live posed no physical barriers, I would still rather walk than not be 
able to walk. However non-discriminatory the society in which I lived, to be able to walk 
would give me more choices and experiences than not being able to walk." JENNY MORRIS, 
PRIDE AGAINST PREJUDICE: TRANSFORMING ATTITUDES TO DISABILITY 1-2, 71 (1991). 
On other disabilities, see JASON KINGSLEY & MITCHELL LEVITZ, COUNT Us IN: 
GROWING UP WITH DOWN SYNDROME 35 (1994) ("Mitchell: I wish I didn't have Down 
syndrome because I would be a regular person, a regular mainstream normal person.") 
(original emphasis omitted); SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST 
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 175, 2 (1996) ("I would joyfully accept a cure 
[for chronic fatigue immune dysfunction syndrome] if it were offered me . . . .  "); Harilyn 
Rousso, Fostering Healthy Self Esteem, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Dec. 1984, at 9, 9-10 ("It is 
not that I would choose to be disabled [with cerebral palsy] . . . .  "); Toombs, supra note 104, 
at 19-20 ("Multiple sclerosis is an unlucky break, and I wish I didn't have it . . . .  [T]here is 
nothing intrinsically good about chronic, progressive multiple sclerosis."). 
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Second, evidence about what other disabled people in the same 
situation have done can reveal information missing from medical or 
other outside expert judgments about the disabled. Studies suggest 
that experts do not always accurately understand disabled people. For 
instance, a number of studies have found that health care professionals 
estimate the quality of their disabled patients' lives to be much lower 
than what the patients themselves report, which may lead the 
professionals to prescribe too much treatment.137 Using the record of 
disabled people's own decisions as evidence in the evaluation of 
reasonableness can help counteract this bias. 
B .  Two Hard Categories of Cases 
The reasonable mitigation standard also provides an appropriate 
means of handling two particularly hard categories of cases. The first 
involves disabled people who do not want to take a mitigating 
137. See, e.g., John R. Bach & Denise I. Campagnolo, Psychosocial Adjustment of Post­
Poliomyelitis Ventilator Assisted Individuals, 73 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & 
REHABILITATION 934, 934 (1992) ("The effect of severe disability, tracheostomy, and 
ventilator use on psychosocial functioning, gainful employment, life satisfaction, and 
perceived well-being were studied for a population of 395 ventilator assisted post­
poliomyelitis individuals (PV Ais) . . . .  Two-hundred-seventy-three physically intact health 
care professionals served as controls. . . . The controls significantly underestimated the 
patients' life satisfaction and well-being scores and significantly overestimated the relative 
hardship associated with ventilator use."); John R. Bach & Margaret C. Tilton, Life 
Satisfaction and Well-Being Measures in Ventilator Assisted Individuals with Traumatic 
Tetraplegia, 75 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 626, 626 (1994) ("This study 
evaluates the effect of complete traumatic tetraplegia on the life satisfaction and well-being 
of 87 individuals, 42 of whom are ventilator supported, 2 years or more postinjury .... 
The . . . life satisfaction (of the 'ventilator assisted individuals with tetraplegia') and other 
well-being and quality of life indicators were generally positive, and were significantly 
underestimated by a control group of health care professionals."); Eugenia Bodenhamer et 
al., Staff and Patient Perceptions of the Psychosocial Concerns of Spinal Cord Injured 
Persons, 62 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. 182, 188 (1983) ("[H)ighly significant differences 
occurred between staff and (the spinal cord injured (SCI)) patients' responses on the four 
scales of Anxiety, Depression, Social Discomfort, and Positive Outlook .... An inspection of 
the means indicates the staff tended to overestimate the amount of depression and social 
discomfort, and underestimate positive outlook and anxiety."); id. at 191 ("(S)ix of the seven 
staff members who were most accurate in their predictions of patient responses were new to 
SCI service, having worked only a year or less with spinal cord injured patients."); Laura A. 
Cushman & Marcel P. Dijkers, Depressed Mood in Spinal Cord Injured Patients: Staff 
Perceptions and Patient Realities, 71 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 191, 
195 (1990) ("There was ...  a consistent bias on the part of staff to overestimate depressed 
mood, relative to the report of [the SCI) patients themselves. This is consistent with the 
suggestion that patient behavior is interpreted according to the prevailing professional 
ideology; in the case of rehabilitation personnel, this view includes depression as a necessary 
phase of adjustment to SCI.") (footnote omitted); Frederick A. Ernst, Contrasting 
Perceptions of Distress by Research Personnel and Their Spinal Cord Injured Subjects, 66 
AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. 12, 13-14 (1987) ("The results of the present study replicate and 
extend those of Bodenhamer, et al. (1983) who reported serious discrepancies in perception 
of distress comparing SCI patients and the rehabilitative professionals who treat them .... 
(O]ur staff overestimated distress on all four of the questionnaire's measures, including 
anxiety."). 
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measure because of the associated risks or side effects, when those 
risks or side effects are serious but ones that a reasonable person in 
the same situation would nevertheless assume for the expected 
benefit. The second inv·olves the small number of disabled people, 
most frequently members of the deaf community, who refuse 
mitigation even if a reasonable person in their situation would 
undertake it because they believe that their disability is central to their 
cultural identity. This Section will explore why these cases raise hard 
issues. It concludes, however, that disabled people in each of these 
situations should still be subject to the duty of reasonable mitigation, 
although courts should consider a plaintiff's interests and claims 
carefully before deciding that the plaintiff's decision not to mitigate is 
unreasonable. 
These categories of cases are difficult because they involve 
unreasonable decisions not to mitigate in circumstances where 
reasonable mitigation would require especially large sacrifices, at least 
from the perspective of the disabled person at issue. Without doubt, a 
disabled person can have legitimate concerns about risks or side 
effects that he alone will have to bear, and these concerns may be 
greatest where the risks or side effects involve serious harm. Imagine, 
for instance, the distress that the duty of reasonable mitigation could 
cause a disabled person who does not want to undergo mitigating 
surgery because he fears the risk of death associated with the use of 
anesthesia, when the disabled person knows that a reasonable person 
would undergo the surgery because it usually ameliorates the disability 
in question and death is very unlikel}' to occur.138 Consider the 
dilemma of a person with a serious impaitment who does not want to 
take a mitigating medicine because of its cognitive side effects, when a 
138. See, e.g. , Yukio Kubota et al., Frequency of Anesthetic Cardiac Arrest and Death in 
the Operating Room at a Single General Hospital over a 30-Year Period, 6 J. CLINICAL 
ANESTHESIA 227, 230-31 (1994) ("Over the 30 years of this prospective study, 85,708 
anesthetics of all kinds were performed in the OR [operating room]. During that time, four 
CAs [cardiac arrests] occurred during anesthesia. Thus, the frequency of CAs is estimated to 
be 1 in 21,427, or 0.5 in 10,000, anesthetics. Three of our patients were successfully 
resuscitated, and one died, yielding a mortality rate during anesthesia of 1 in 85,708, or 0.1 in 
10,000, anesthetics. Over this 30-year period, there were no surgical deaths due to events 
such as massive hemorrhage or surgical mismanagement during anesthesia.") (citations 
omitted); Myrna C. Newland et al., Anesthetic-Related Cardiac Arrest and Its Mortality: A 
Report Covering 72,959 Anesthetics over JO Years from a US Teaching Hospital, 97 
ANESTHESIOLOGY 108, 108 (2002) ("One hundred forty-four cases of cardiac arrest within 
24 h of surgery were identified over a 10-yr period from an anesthesia database of 72,959 
anesthetics . . . .  Fifteen cardiac arrests out of a total number of 144 were judged to be related 
to anesthesia. Five cardiac arrests were anesthesia-attributable, resulting in an anesthesia­
attributable cardiac arrest rate of 0.69 per 10,000 anesthetics . . . .  Ten cardiac arrests were 
found to be anesthesia-contributory, resulting in an anesthesia-contributory rate of 1.37 per 
10,000 anesthetics . . . .  The risk of death related to anesthesia-attributable perioperative 
cardiac arrest was 0.55 per 10,000 anesthetics . . . .  "). 
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reasonable person with that impairment would be willing to take the 
medicine for its expected benefits. 139 
Similarly, even if one has doubts about the wisdom of a disabled 
person constructing a disability-based identity for himself, the lives 
and public statements of a small number of disabled people do reflect 
their commitment to such an identity. These disabled people 
frequently express the conviction that they would not change their 
disability if they could because it is a significant part of who they are. 
For instance, I. King Jordan, the president of Gallaudet University, 
which is dedicated to deaf students, 140 has denied that "there [is] a 
significant absence when you can't hear" and compared asking a deaf 
person if he would like to hear to "ask[ing] a black person, 'Suppose 
you could take a pill and become white, would you take it?'"141 Some 
disabled people outside the deaf community articulate similar beliefs. 
Cyndi Jones, who had polio, has stated that she would not take "a 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 85-87, 95, 104. 
140. See, e.g. , JOHN B. CHRISTIANSEN & SHARON N. BARNARTI, DEAF PRESIDENT 
Now!: THE 1988 REVOLUTION AT GALLAUDET UNIVERSITY, at vii, 160-63, 194 (1995); 
JACK R. GANNON, THE WEEK THE WORLD HEARD GALLAUDET 15, 20, 144 (1989). 
141. 60 Minutes: King Jordan (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 11 ,  1990) (transcript at 14, 
on file with author). Oliver Markwirth, who has served as president of the Dallas County 
Deaf Caucus, has similarly contended that: '"Trying to make a deaf person hearing is like 
telling a black person to change his skin . . . .  Why do you want to make all people be the 
same?"' Christine Wicker, Sound Barrier: These Deaf People Are Flourishing with Their 
Own Culture, Language and Humor. And a Strong Bond in Their Isolation, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 17, 1993, Magazine, at 8, 10. Judith Coryell, who has been head of the 
deaf education program at Western Maryland College, has also employed an analogy to race 
to describe the importance of deafness to her identity. '"Let me put it this way,"' she has 
explained. '"Say you were black. Do you think you'd be considering surgery to make 
yourself white?"' Marie Arana-Ward, As Technology Advances, a Bitter Debate Divides the 
Deaf, WASH. POST, May 11,  1997, at Al, A20. Along the same lines, Genie Gertz, who 
represented New York in a Miss Deaf America contest, has reported that she '"wouldn't 
ever change [being deaf]. Why would I?'" Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 28, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 45. Clara Gantes, a deaf teacher of sign language, has 
stated that she doesn't '"regret being deaf at all and I don't want to leave deaf people. It's a 
part of me."' John Barry, Silence Is Golden?, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 22, 1991, Tropic, at 8, 
12, 16. Susan Philip, who has been coordinator of deaf services at Northeastern University, 
has said that: '"My deafness is normal to me . . . .  and I have no interest in an implant."' 
Richard Saltus, Some Spurn Implants, Say They Don't Want to Abandon the Deaf Culture, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 1989, at 29, 29; see also BERNARD BRAGG, LESSONS IN 
LAUGHTER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A DEAF ACTOR 4 (Eugene Bergman trans., 1989) 
("I thought deafness was a way of life and never linked it with sickness, defectiveness, or a 
handicapped condition. I thought, and I still do, that my deafness is just part of who I am."); 
J. William Evans, Thoughts on the Psychosocial Implications of Cochlear Implantation in 
Children, in COCHLEAR IMPLANTS IN YOUNG DEAF CHILDREN 307, 307-08 (Elmer Owens 
& Dorcas K. Kessler eds., 1989) ("In an informal survey (Evans, unpublished raw data), 
prelingually deafened adults were asked whether they would choose to have an implant if it 
were possible that some hearing could be restored. The response was approximately 85 
percent negative. The common explanation they offered was that the procedure would be 
destructive to their social relationships, to the world that they had come to know, and to 
their adaptive mechanisms."); Solomon, supra, at 40 ('"I am black and Deaf and proud and I 
don't want to be white or hearing or different in any way from who I am."' (quoting a 
student at the Lexington Center for the Deaf)). 
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magic pill" that would allow her to walk again, contending that this 
question is '"the same thing as asking a black person would he change 
the color of his skin."' '"Even if you don't like the way society treats 
you as a disabled person, it's part of your experience, it's part of how 
you come to be who you are. "'142 Indeed, at least some members of 
this group of disabled people, especially the deaf among them, report 
that they want their children to share their disability and the 
associated cultural identity. Joan Philip Meehan, for example, 
"'want[ed] my daughter to be like me, to be deaf."'143 Daniel Smith 
and his wife '"were very excited, happy [when their child was born 
deaf] . We were thrilled . . . .  Doctors thought it would be bad news -
we had different perspectives. "'144 
142. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12, 14 (1993). Nadina LaSpina, who also had polio, has similarly 
insisted that she "'would not trade my disability for anything . . . .  We will not change to fit 
the mold . . . .  Instead, we will destroy the mold and change the world to make sure there is 
room for everyone."' Douglas Martin, Disability Culture: Eager to Bite the Hands that Would 
Feed Them, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 ,  1997, § 4, at 1 ,  1. Gene Chelberg, who is blind, has 
campaigned for the establishment of a cultural center for disabled students at the University 
of Minnesota by recounting that: '"For years, we have been asked to live in this able-bodied 
world, trying to become able-bodied people. The idea here is, I'm proud of my disability and 
I don't need to be fixed."' Cultural Center for the Disabled Prompts Debate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 1992, § 1, at 45, 45. Steven E. Brown, a founder of the Institute on Disability 
Culture, has declared that: "'We claim our disabilities with pride as part of our identity. We 
are who we are: we are people with disabilities."' Martin, supra, at 1 .  
143. Saltus, supra note 141 ,  at  29. 
144. Deaf Parents Are Happy When Their Baby ls Born Deaf, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Oct. 11,  1994, at 3A, 3A. Paula Sargent explains that "'deaf people feel about deaf children 
the way Indians feel about Indian children. It's like, 'You're part of us."" Barry, supra note 
141, at 13; see also id. at 11 ("'Actually, I wish there were more deaf babies being born,' [sign 
language teacher Lynn Frankel] types. 'That's an awful thing to say if you don't understand 
my position, but to me a deaf child is a blessing, not a burden, and I am really proud of the 
fact that when God was handing out handicaps, I was one of the chosen to get a handicap of 
deafness.'"); id. at 12 ("At Gallaudet's genetic counseling center, couples come to find out 
how likely it is for deafness to be passed on. What is the 'risk,' some ask, of having hearing 
children?"); HARLAN LANE ET AL., A JOURNEY INTO THE DEAF-WORLD 18 (1996) ("'We 
were starting on my kids,' said Henry. 'Like Jake's folks, my wife and I weren't expecting 
our children to be Deaf because we both have hearing parents and the rest of our extended 
families are all hearing. So it was a surprise to us with both kids, but we were thrilled when 
we found out. It was pretty confusing for the doctors, let me tell you. The audiologist came 
in after the test looking very apprehensive and said, 'I am so sorry. The test shows that your 
baby is Deaf, although there may be a chance of residual . . .  .' He stopped because my wife 
and I were hugging each other, we were so happy. He thought we were nuts.'") (original 
emphasis omitted); Abigail Trafford, Controlling Genetic Roulette, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 
1994, Health, at 6, 6 ("'Many of our families are not interested in fixing or curing deaf 
genes,' explains genetic counselor Jamie Israel at the genetic services center at Gallaudet. 
'Many . . .  couples come in and want . . .  deaf children."'); Wicker, supra note 141, at 10 
("Ross Roeser, director of Dallas' Callier Center for Communication Disorders, gives an 
example he hopes will illuminate. 'You know, when we have two parents who are both deaf,' 
says Dr. Roeser, who is hearing, 'and we test their baby and the baby turns out to be hearing, 
they grieve, just like hearing parents who are told they have a child who is deaf."'). 
Not surprisingly, surveys consistently find that deaf people generally choose other deaf 
people as marriage partners. See, e.g. , JEROME D. SCHEIN & MARCUS T. DELK, JR., THE 
DEAF POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 41 (1974) ("In choosing a marital partner, 
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In addition, this category of disabled people has a record of 
organized resistance to protect their disability-based cultural 
identity.145 In March 1988, for instance, deaf students at Gallaudet 
University in Washington, D.C. succeeded in closing the school for a 
week until the Board of Trustees agreed to appoint the university's 
first deaf president, I. King Jordan.146 The students, joined by 
thousands of deaf supporters from around the country who staged 
rallies in their hometowns and who traveled to Washington to 
participate in marches,147 protested that the hearing person that the 
trustees had initially chosen as president was not fluent in sign 
language and did not understand deaf culture.148 The social life of this 
the majority of deaf persons favor deaf partners. Among married deaf persons in the current 
[national) survey [of people deaf before age nineteen), most have deaf spouses . . . .  The rate 
for nonwhite deaf females is nearly the same as for white deaf females: a little over 14 
percent having hearing spouses. The overall rates are close to those reported for New York 
State and Washington, D.C. Rainer et al. asked their deaf sample about preference for 
spouse's hearing; 86 percent expressed a desire for a deaf mate."); John D. Rainer & W. 
Edwards Deming, Demographic Aspects: Number, Distribution, Marriage and Fertility 
Statistics, in FAMILY AND MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS IN A DEAF POPULATION 13, 13, 17 
(John D. Rainer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1969) ("[In a survey 'of literate deaf persons,'] only 5.1 per 
cent of women born deaf, and 8.7 per cent of those that became deaf at an early age, were 
married to hearing men. The rest had husbands who had been deaf since birth or early 
childhood. Almost 30 per cent of the marriages where both partners were born deaf, and 
from 14 to 21 per cent of those where only one partner was born deaf, resulted in deaf 
children, usually more than one."). 
145. This has historically been a crucial marker of the importance of religious identity, 
for instance. See, e.g. , Donald A. Erickson, Showdown at an Amish Schoolhouse, in 
COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND THE AMISH: THE RIGHT NOT TO BE MODERN 43, 43-48 
(Albert N. Keim ed., 1975) (describing organized Amish resistance to efforts to enforce 
compulsory schooling laws by removing Amish children from schools run by the Amish). 
146. See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT, supra note 140, at vii-viii, 158-63; GANNON, 
supra note 140, at 15, 48, 50, 144. 
147. See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT, supra note 140, at 133, 150-51, 156, 184-85; 
GANNON, supra note 140, at 37-38, 94, 109. 
148. See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT, supra note 140, at vii-viii, 60, 79-81, 94, 96, 100, 
102-04, 129, 133; GANNON, supra note 140, at 15, 109. Inspired by the successful "Deaf 
President Now" campaign at Gallaudet, a group of deaf students and alumni from the 
Lexington Center for the Deaf in New York City organized a series of demonstrations in 
April and May of 1994 that led to the resignation of the center's hearing chief executive 
officer and the appointment of Phil Bravin, a leading figure in the deaf community, as 
president of the center's board. Solomon, supra note 141, at 40, 42-43; see also David 
Firestone, Chief Executive to Step down at Deaf Center, N.Y. DMES, June 22, 1994, at B3, 
B3; David Firestone, Deaf Students Protest New School Head, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at 
B3, B3. Students at the Wisconsin School for the Deaf closed the school down for two days 
in November 1991 until the state agreed to formulate a plan to recruit deaf people for staff 
positions at the school and to search for a deaf person to serve as the school's next 
superintendent. See Richard L. Kenyon, Sign It Loud: I'm Deaf, and I'm Proud, 
MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 5, 1992, Magazine, at 4, 7. 
The broader disability culture movement, in turn, has orchestrated repeated, nationwide 
protests of the annual Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystrophy Association Telethon, charging that 
"its pity approach to fund-raising" contributes to the view that disabled people are 
"childlike, helpless, hopeless, nonfunctioning and noncontributing members of society," 
Evan Kemp Jr., Aiding the Disabled: No Pity, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1981, at A19, A19, 
"'only worthwhile if we can be cured,"' Greg Lopez, Disabilities Don't Cripple Life, Woman 
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category of disabled people also frequently revolves around cultural 
institutions focused on a disability-based identity. Many deaf people, 
for example, have devoted significant portions of their lives to deaf 
clubs.149 There are also deaf arts festivals,150 deaf film festivals,151 deaf 
beauty pageants,152 deaf theater companies,153 and deaf plays.154 The 
Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 6, 1993, at SA, SA (quoting the organizers of "the first 
demonstration in Denver against the telethon"); see also Alexandra M. Biesada, Protesters 
Object to 'Jerry's Kid' Image, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 7, 1993, at B2, B2; Katy 
Butler, Jerry Lewis Telethon Protested in Oakland, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 1992, at All, All;  
Peter Larsen, Annual Telethon Protested: Disabled Call Lewis' Style Demeaning, DAILY 
NEWS (Los Angeles), Sept. 7, 1992, at 4-News, 4-News; Holly Yettick, Protesters Arrested at 
Telethon, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 4, 2001, at 17A, 17A. This movement has also 
held demonstrations that denounce efforts to legalize assisted suicide, arguing that the right­
to-die movement is " 'promulgating the view that disability is inherently undignified"' so 
"that someone who has become disabled might want to have assisted suicide as an option." 
Jeanne Malmgren, Promoting Living Despite Disability, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 2S, 
1999, at lD, 6D (quoting Diane Coleman, "spokeswoman for Not Dead Yet"). 
149. One deaf woman, for instance, has explained that her deaf social club in 
Philadelphia "'is like [her] home."' As she elaborated, "'for Deaf people the Deaf club is 
like a second home. Hearing people don't have anything like that. They go home from work, 
put on headphones, and listen to their stereos or watch television. But the Deaf get together 
and socialize at their club. It's like a second home.'" Stephanie A. Hall, Door into Deaf 
Culture: Folklore in an American Deaf Social Club, 73 SIGN LANGUAGE STUD . 421, 421 
(1991). "'The deaf club,"' another deaf person has similarly reported, is "'where the deaf 
meet. It's their gathering place, the heart of their world, their ballroom, their bar, their 
theater, their co=unity center-all rolled into one."' BRAGG, supra note 141, at 190-91 
(quoting Gene Bergman, coauthor of the deaf play Tales from a Clubroom); see also LOU 
ANN WALKER, A LOSS FOR WORDS: THE STORY OF DEAFNESS IN A FAMILY 117-18 (1986) 
("The network of organizations Morn and Dad belonged to entailed every conceivable 
social, intellectual, and athletic function. Obviously, because the deaf population is limited, 
many of the clubs in Indianapolis had overlapping memberships, but still, the commitment of 
those members was amazing . . . .  The clubs held dances, had basketball and softball leagues, 
dinners, endless parties and get-togethers. One or several of these groups sponsored nursing 
homes and children's camps, provided scholarships, crowned a Miss Deaf Indiana, and 
much, much more."). 
lSO. See, e.g. , Lynette Clemetson, An International Gathering for the Deaf in the Arts, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at Bl, Bl ("[Willy] Conley, now an actor, playwright and director, 
is one of 400 artists - visual, performing and literary - whose works are being featured in 
Deaf Way II, an international arts festival and conference that begins today in 
Washington . . . .  The weeklong extravaganza is said to be the largest event in any country 
devoted to deaf issues and the arts. More than 8,SOO people from 108 countries have 
registered, and organizers are expecting hundreds more."); id. at BS ("[Gallaudet] university 
convened the first Deaf Way conference in 1989, planning for SOO people. More than S,000 
showed up."). 
lSl. See, e.g. , John Petrakis, Cinema Scoping: A Look at the Local Fests for Nearly 
Every Interest, CHI. TR!B., Feb. 22, 2002, § 7A, at 8, 8 ("[The goal of the Festival of Cinema 
for the Deaf] is to show movies made by or starring deaf artists, while also presenting 
documentaries or fiction films about the deaf experience."). 
1S2. See, e.g. , Ray Quintanilla, Beauty Queen Really Signs on with Kids: Deafness Is Not 
a Disability, Says Former Miss Deaf America Winner, CHI . TR!B., Sept. 23, 1994, § 2, at 1 ,  1 
("Stephanie Long, 24, . . .  just completed a two-year stint as Miss Deaf America . . . .  [T]here 
will always be a Miss Deaf America, Long said, referring to the pageant that's in its 20th 
year."); id. at 1, 8 ("Long told the Parkwood pupils not to look upon deafness as a 
disability . . . .  'The only difference between deaf people and everyone else is that deaf people 
can't hear,' Long said. 'Don't think of your difference as a weakness,' she said."). 
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broader disability culture movement has similarly produced plays, 155 
theater companies, 156 performing arts festivals, 157 films, 158 film 
festivals,159 and cultural centers in universities.160 
153. See, e.g. , HELEN POWERS, SIGNS OF SILENCE: BERNARD BRAGG AND THE 
NATIONAL THEATRE OF THE DEAF 1 15-16 (1972) (describing the founding of the National 
Theatre of the Deaf, "the first professional theater made up of deaf performers"); BRAGG, 
supra note 141, at 111, 1 16-17 (same); id. at 191 (describing "the Hughes Memorial Theatre, 
Washington's longtime community theater of the deaf'). 
154. See, e.g. , BERNARD BRAGG & EUGENE BERGMAN, TALES FROM A CLUBROOM, at 
xii (1981) ("It is a fact and not puffery that this play, written by the deaf for the deaf, has met 
with enthusiastic responses from deaf audiences wherever it was performed. So there must 
be something genuine about it-something with which the deaf can identify-and that was 
our aim in the first place . . . .  As we see it, and as we know other deaf people see it, our play 
reflects the vibrant and buoyant life of a close-knit community."); GILBERT C. EASTMAN, 
SIGN ME ALICE, at xi (1974) ("In past years the Gallaudet College Theatre has presented 
classic or contemporary plays in which the principal characters (antagonists and 
protagonists) express their ideas, arguments, and feelings in speeches that must be 
translated, and we the deaf don't fully live the parts because they portray the life of the 
hearing. Sign Me Alice is about the life of the deaf mingling in the world of the hearing. The 
heroine does not ask for pity but for the right to the deafs choice: sign language or any of 
the artificial languages that use signs to represent English."). 
155. See, e.g., Mike Ervin, The History of Bowling (Oct. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author); Cheryl Marie Wade, Sassy Girl: Memoirs of a Poster Child Gone Awry 
(1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Carrie Sandahl, 7 Plays About Physical 
Difference: Facets of the Experience of Disability from the Insiders' Perspective, AM. 
THEATRE, Apr. 2001, at 21, 22 ("A growing number of playwrights and performance artists 
have given artistic expression to the experiences and culture of disability from an insider's 
perspective . . . .  [T]hese insider plays consistently challenge notions of physical impairment 
as a metaphor for evil, sin, helplessness and psychological trauma or, conversely, innocence 
and saintliness . . . .  In addition, the characters in these plays cannot be 'reduced' to their 
impairments . . . .  Unlike those portrayed in TV movies-of-the-week or mainstream films, 
these characters are not obsessed with 'overcoming' or 'curing' their conditions, but take 
their bodies as givens, exploring the intersection between their subjective and complex 
experiences of disability and the larger culture's often objectifying and limiting 
perceptions."). 
156. See, e.g. , Greg Freeman, Readers Offer Their Favorite "Uniquities" - What's 
Special About Living in St. Louis Area, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 28, 2001, at C3, C3 
('"The DisAbility Project [is] a project of That Uppity Theatre Company. An ensemble of 
disabled and nondisabled adults who range in age from 18-70, we create, perform and tour 
innovative, original theatrical material about the culture of disability."' (quoting Joan 
Lipkin)); Kathleen Tolan, We Are Not a Metaphor: A Conversation About Representation, 
AM. THEATRE, Apr. 2001, at 16, 17-18 ("[T]he disability rights movement and 'crip culture' 
are challenging our preconceptions about what it is to be human . . . .  Working both inside 
and outside traditional theatre institutions, the disability community has nurtured a body of 
work devoted to the disability experience. The longest-lived disability-specific group is 
Brother Rick Curry's National Theatre Workshop for the Handicapped, which has been in 
existence since 1977 and has campuses in Maine and New York City. NTWH offers 
professional training and performance opportunities to artists with disabilities. Other 
companies have explicitly activist aims: to empower people with disabilities to take control 
of their own stories and their own images through performance. Joan Lipkin's DisAbility 
Project in St. Louis and Wry Crips, a disabled women's theatre collective in the Bay area, . . .  
are two such groups."). 
157. See, e.g., Kenny Fries, Introduction, in STARING BACK: THE DISABILITY 
EXPERIENCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 1, 9 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) ("In 1994, I was invited to 
and participated in the historic 'A Contemporary Chautauqua: Disability and Performance,' 
organized by Victoria Ann-Lewis, director of Other Voices, at the Mark Taper Forum in Los 
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In each of these two categories of cases, complying with the duty of 
reasonable mitigation could require plaintiffs to make particularly 
large sacrifices, at least from the plaintiff's own perspective. 
Nonetheless, I would still apply the duty of reasonable mitigation to 
these difficult cases. The same arguments for imposing a duty to 
mitigate on other plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I's 
reasonable accommodation prov1s1on hold here as well. The 
employers or prospective employers of the plaintiffs in the two 
difficult categories of cases have a legitimate interest in minimizing the 
costs associated with accommodation if mitigation is possible and 
reasonable for the plaintiffs to undertake. These plaintiffs should also 
not be able to avail themselves of Title l's reasonable accommodation 
provision because they have chosen not to mitigate when mitigation 
would be reasonable. 
Moreover, creating a separate standard, outside of the reasonable 
mitigation standard, to govern these two difficult categories of cases 
would produce endless disputes and an extensive collateral 
jurisprudence about when each of the two standards should apply. 
Some tort cases, for example, hold that a plaintiff disabled by tort 
need not mitigate when the associated risks or side effects are 
Angeles. That April weekend, prominent artists with disabilities gathered from all across the 
United States to perform, read, teach, learn, talk, and get to know one another. That we had 
something valuable to offer was evidenced not only by an audience hungry to share our 
work, not only by the overcrowded classes, the sold-out performances, the TV camera crews 
from CNN and WNET, but also by the lasting nurturing relationships forged by many of the 
participant artists."). 
158. See, e.g. , Neal Karlen, No Ordinary Inspirational 'Cripple Story, ' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
26, 1995, § 2, at 20, 20 ('"When Billy Broke His Head' is more a disabled version of 'On the 
Road,' with [Billy] Golfus as Jack Kerouac's Sal Paradise. Beginning at a fiery disability­
rights demonstration in Chicago, he wends his way to California and back to Minnesota to 
visit the blind, the bent and the paralyzed, people trying to get by amid social stigmas and 
government neglect. Also woven into the narrative are what he sees as patronizing images of 
the disabled: Jerry Lewis crooning to wheelchair-bound children at a Labor Day telethon, 
Lon Chaney eating the scenery in 'The Hunchback of Notre Dame."'). 
159. See, e.g. , Elizabeth Lenhard, Disability Film Fest Tries to Even Playing Field, 
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 14, 1996, at D2, D2 ("Miramar's Disability Film Festival, created at 
the behest of the Third Paralympic Congress, won't look back at cinema's bitter paraplegics 
and blind damsels in distress. Instead, it will introduce dozens of new films - everything 
from slick, feature-length documentaries bound for television networks to rough-edged two­
minute shorts to public service announcements - that affirm the disability experience and 
reveal corners of the culture."). 
160. See, e.g. , Meg McSherry Breslin, Anna Stonum, 40, Activist for Disabled, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 13, 1999, § 1, at 23, 23 (discussing "the Disability Arts and Culture Center at the 
University of Illinois"); Dianne B. Piastro, Rejecting the Role of the Victim, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), July 13, 1993, at 9E, 9E ("As more and more disabled people discard the roles 
of isolated victims, and reflect pride in their shared experience, disability culture will simply 
become accepted as an integral part of the cultural diversity of this country. Toward this 
goal, an exciting gathering of student leaders with disabilities from college campuses around 
the country is being convened . . . .  Hosted by the Disabled Student Cultural Center at the 
University of Minnesota, this precedent-setting conference will explore disability culture and 
pride."); supra note 142. 
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particularly serious, even if a reasonable person in the same situation 
would mitigate.161 This jurisprudence quickly demonstrates, however, 
that there is no obvious or widely accepted way to judge when risks or 
side effects are particularly serious. Minnesota, for instance, originally 
exempted people disabled by torts from a duty of reasonable 
mitigation if the mitigation involved "a major surgical operation."162 
But the state supreme court dropped this exception in 1973, after 
recognizing "that the term 'major surgery' as used in [the state's jury] 
instruction [was] too indefinite."163 The judiciary has even less 
expertise or experience in determining whether a disability is central 
to a plaintiff's cultural identity. 
Yet these two hard categories of cases do suggest that courts need 
to proceed carefully before deciding that a Title I plaintiff's decision 
not to mitigate is unreasonable. As noted above, for example, 
empirical evidence about what other disabled people in the same 
situation have done should be relevant in judging reasonableness. It 
gives fact finders a solid foundation from which to work in deciding 
hard cases. The greater the percentage of disabled people in the 
plaintiff's situation who have mitigated, the more likely it is that 
mitigation is the only reasonable choice.164 At the same time, decisions 
by a majority of people in the same situation to mitigate do not always 
mean that the people who have made the other choice are 
unreasonable. In some situations, the sacrifice that mitigation would 
demand from a plaintiff may be great enough, or the costs and benefits 
of mitigation so closely matched, that decisions both in favor and 
against mitigation are reasonable, even though a majority of people in 
the situation choose to mitigate. Courts, accordingly, should not 
automatically and mechanically equate reasonableness with majority 
rule. Instead, courts should appraise the reasonableness of a plaintiff's 
decision against mitigation carefully, considering to the extent possible 
why people in the plaintiff's situation have or have not mitigated and 
161. See, e.g., McDonnell v. McPartlin, 708 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) ("Illinois 
law is clear: a plaintiff has no duty to mitigate his damages by submitting to serious or major 
surgery."); Hall v. Durnitru, 620 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("[T]he rule regarding 
mitigation of damages in relation to suggested medical treatment is as follows: A patient has 
a duty to submit to reasonable medical care and treatment intended to improve the patient's 
condition and reduce or eliminate the consequences of the defendant's tortious act . . . .  An 
exception to this general rule exists with respect to surgical procedures as well as nonsurgical 
procedures which present a risk of enhanced or additional injury."). 
162. Couture v. Novotny, 211 N.W.2d 172, 174-75 (Minn. 1973). 
163. Id. at 176; see also id. ("We . . .  direct that the following instruction, at least in 
substance, be used in this case: If you find that the injuries suffered by Couture can be 
alleviated by a surgical operation and that a reasonably prudent person would undergo such 
an operation, under all of the circumstances in this case, then such a finding should be taken 
into consideration by you as a factor which would reduce the amount of damages to which 
Couture would otherwise be entitled."). 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37. 
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not just how many people have made each choice. This somewhat 
more flexible approach could do much more to recognize plaintiffs' 
legitimate interests, justifying its somewhat higher demands on fact 
finders.165 In this way, courts applying a reasonable mitigation 
standard in Title I suits can appropriately adjudicate and resolve both 
the vast bulk of cases in which the plaintiff has not mitigated, and two 
particularly difficult categories of cases as well. 
Ill. PROTECTION FOR PEOPLE WHO HA VE MITIGATED 
The case for imposing a duty to mitigate on plaintiffs seeking the 
protection of Title I's reasonable accommodation provision does not 
depend on whether Sutton's rulings about the status of plaintiffs who 
have mitigated remain in force or are legislatively overridden. But this 
Part briefly reexamines the legal rights of mitigators in light of the 
proposed duty of reasonable mitigation. Under Sutton, only two 
groups of mitigators are protected under Title I. The first group 
consists of mitigators who are still substantially limited in a major life 
activity after mitigating. They count as "disabled" people under 
Sutton.166 The second group consists of mitigators who are not 
substantially limited after mitigation, but who suffer an adverse 
employment action because an employer thinks that they have an 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. These 
plaintiffs count as "regarded as" disabled people under Sutton.167 Both 
of these groups of mitigators merit Title I protection. The plaintiffs in 
the first situation have complied with the duty to mitigate, yet remain 
disabled and in potential need of accommodation, and the employers' 
intentions and motivations in the second situation are exactly the sort 
that Title I seeks to regulate. This Part argues, however, that Sutton's 
definition of "regarded as" disabled persons should be expanded to 
include two more classes of mitigators who are not substantially 
limited after mitigation: people who suffer an adverse employment 
action because they had to mitigate and people who suffer an adverse 
employment action because of the (non-substantially-limiting) side 
effects of the mitigation. 
165. For some leading examples from the extensive debate over the relative advantages 
of rules and standards, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 
104 & n.35 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557, 559-68 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685-1713 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 379, 379-90 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: 
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-95 (1992). 
166. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999). 
167. See id. at 489; see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22 
(1999). 
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Identifying these two classes of mitigators as people who are 
"regarded as" disabled would protect them from intentional 
discrimination. Stated more precisely, it would mean that if these 
mitigators "can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position," they cannot legally be denied a job because they had to 
mitigate or because they have non-substantially-limiting side effects 
from mitigation.168 This protection would advance what Title I 
recognizes as legitimate interests, while infringing upon none of the 
legitimate interests of employers. These plaintiffs should be 
considered "regarded as" disabled rather than disabled people, 
however, because they no longer have actual substantial limitations. 
For the same reason, they should not have a right to reasonable 
accommodation. The case law is currently divided on whether 
"regarded as" disabled plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable 
accommodation.169 But the majority of courts that have found no 
accommodation right for "regarded as" disabled plaintiffs have the 
better argument.170 Although Title I's text does not indicate that 
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (2000). 
169. For decisions holding that Title I plaintiffs who are "regarded as" disabled are not 
entitled to reasonable accommodations, see cases cited infra note 170. For decisions holding 
or suggesting that Title I plaintiffs who are "regarded as" disabled are entitled to reasonable 
accommodations, see Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751 ,  774 (3d Cir. 
2004) ("While we do not rule out the possibility that there may be situations in which 
applying the reasonable accommodation requirement in favor of a 'regarded as' disabled 
employee would produce 'bizarre results,' we perceive no basis for an across-the-board 
refusal to apply the ADA in accordance with the plain meaning of its text. Here, and in what 
seem to us to be at least the vast majority of cases, a literal reading of the Act will not 
produce such results. Accordingly, we will remain faithful to its directive in this case."); Katz 
v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that whether "regarded as" 
disabled plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodations was an 
issue for the jury); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 163, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
("The Court disagrees with Weber and a11 the other courts that have held that reasonable 
accommodations should not be available where a plaintiff is 'regarded as' disabled. The 
Court's conclusion is driven by a number of considerations: (1) the plain language of the 
ADA; (2) the legislative history behind the 'regarded as' prong; (3) the mandatory 
interactive process, as referenced in Jewell, and (4) the Court's critiques of Weber's 
underlying rationale."). 
170. See Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2003) ("If 
we were to conclude that 'regarded as' plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodation, 
impaired employees would be better off under the statute if their employers treated them as 
disabled even if they were not. This would be a perverse and troubling result under a statute 
aimed at decreasing 'stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of 
[people with disabilities].' . . .  To require accommodation for those not truly disabled would 
[also] compel employers to waste resources unnecessarily, when the employers' limited 
resources would be better spent assisting those persons who are actua11y disabled and in 
genuine need of accommodation to perform to their potential. . . .  [W]e hold that there is no 
duty to accommodate an employee in an 'as regarded' case.") (citation omitted); Weber v. 
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Imposing liability on employers who fail 
to accommodate non-disabled employees who are simply regarded as disabled would lead to 
bizarre results . . . .  The ADA cannot reasonably have been intended to create a disparity in 
treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the right to 
reasonable accommodations but granting to others, because of their employers' 
misperceptions, a right to reasonable accommodations no more limited than those afforded 
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"regarded as" disabled people are to be treated differently than 
disabled people, the motivating logic behind the reasonable 
accommodation provision is that accommodations are a way of 
restructuring jobs to take account of a person's substantial limitations. 
People without actual substantial limitations have no need for 
reasonable accommodations. People who are discriminated against 
because they had to mitigate or because of the non-substantially­
limiting side effects of the mitigation do, however, have a strong case 
for protection from intentional discrimination. Consider each of these 
two classes of mitigators in turn. 
Begin with the situation of a plaintiff who is no longer substantially 
limited after mitigating, but is denied employment because he had to 
mitigate. The myopic Sutton plaintiffs fit into this category. Their 
eyesight was no longer substantially limited when they wore corrective 
lenses, but United Airlines would not hire them because they needed 
to mitigate by wearing the lenses.171 Another potential example might 
involve a manic depressive who is no longer substantially limited when 
he takes lithium, but is denied employment because he needs to 
mitigate by consuming the lithium. 
It would be impossible to predict all of the reasons why an 
employer might refuse to hire this class of job applicants because they 
had to mitigate, but four possibilities are apparent. First, an employer 
may harbor something like pure prejudice against disabled people or 
people that the employer associates with disability. An employer may 
fear or loathe people with manic depression, for instance, no matter 
what they do to mitigate. Second, an employer may have unfounded 
doubts about the effectiveness of an applicant's mitigation. The 
employer may not actually think that the applicant remains 
substantially limited, which would allow the applicant to be protected 
under Sutton's narrow definition of "regarded as" disabled.172 But the 
employer may be convinced without reason that the applicant has 
some lesser, yet still disqualifying, limitation. For example, an 
employer may not believe how effective lithium is at controlling manic 
actually disabled employees. Accordingly, we hold that 'regarded as' disabled plaintiffs are 
not entitled to reasonable accommodations . . . .  "); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 
467 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Under the third prong, 'regarded as' having a disability, the defendant 
correctly contends that a finding on this basis would obviate the Company's obligation to 
reasonably accommodate Workman."); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 
(5th Cir. 1998) ("[A]n employer need not provide reasonable accommodation to an 
employee who does not suffer from a substantially limiting impairment merely because the 
employer thinks the employee has such an impairment."); Cebertowicz v. Motorola, Inc., 178 
F: Supp. 2d 949, 953-54 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("[T]his Court joins those courts that have held an 
employer has no duty under the [ADA] to provide a viewed-as-disabled (but not actually 
disabled) employee with any accommodation.") (citations omitted). 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
172. See supra text accompanying note 167. 
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depression, or how much corrective lenses can improve someone's 
ability to see. Third, an employer may not trust the applicant to 
continue to mitigate, in circumstances where mitigation requires 
efforts that are ongoing (like the daily consumption of medicine or the 
daily use of corrective lenses) rather than singular (like surgery). If the 
applicant decides to stop mitigating, and thereby fails to satisfy his 
duty of reasonable mitigation, he would no longer be protected under 
Title I and could legitimately be denied employment. But the 
employer may believe that this is inadequate protection with respect 
to a particular job or applicant. For instance, United Airlines might 
not want to hire manic depressive pilots who mitigate with lithium 
because of the importance of airplane safety and the risk that the 
airline will not be able to detect immediately whether the pilots have 
decided to stop taking lithium. Fourth, an employer may fear that a 
presently effective mitigating measure will fail at an inopportune 
moment for reasons beyond the applicant's control. United Airlines, 
for example, might believe that the Sutton plaintiffs have no 
substantial limitations when they wear corrective lenses, but worry 
that the plaintiffs' lenses could be lost or broken in an emergency. 
An employer's first two possible reasons for refusing to hire an 
applicant because he had to mitigate would be prohibited if the 
applicant was protected as a "regarded as" disabled person. But an 
employer has no legitimate interest under Title I in taking adverse 
employment actions for those reasons, and including the applicant in 
these situations within the protection of Title I would advance 
legitimate interests under the statute. First, employers have no 
legitimate interest under Title I in acting out of pure animus toward 
disability. Indeed, one of Title I's goals is to combat fear and loathing 
of the disabled.173 Second, employers have no legitimate interest under 
Title I in acting on baseless doubts about whether mitigation can be 
effective. To the contrary, one of the core premises behind imposing a 
duty to mitigate has to be the conviction that mitigation can materially 
lessen or eliminate disabilities in some situations. 
Moreover, recognizing plaintiffs who are discriminated against 
because they had to mitigate as "regarded as" disabled people would 
still protect the legitimate interests of employers. As a preliminary 
matter, an employer's legitimate interest in minimizing the cost that 
can be associated with providing accommodations is not at stake here. 
These plaintiffs no longer need accommodation because they have 
complied with the duty to mitigate. In addition, employers would 
remain free to refuse employment to people who actually cannot 
perform a job because they had to mitigate. Recall that Title I defines 
the "qualified" people who are entitled to protection from intentional 
173. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12112(a). 
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employment discrimination as people who "can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position."174 In most cases, the fact that 
an applicant has mitigated will not prevent her from performing the 
essential functions of a job. The fact that a myopic person depends on 
corrective lenses that may break, for instance, does not plausibly 
disqualify that person from office work because the lenses can be 
easily replaced with little disruption for the employer. But in some 
cases the fact of mitigation will make someone unable to perform the 
essential functions of the job, and an employer would then be free to 
deny the applicant work for that reason. Myopic pilots who mitigate 
with corrective lenses or manic depressive pilots who mitigate with 
lithium, for instance, might very well be unable to establish that they 
can perform the essential functions of a pilot's job, given the 
importance that job places on maintaining extremely high safety levels 
and constant preparedness. 
Tum to the situation of a plaintiff who is no longer substantially 
limited in any major life activity after mitigating, but is denied 
employment because of a non-substantially-limiting side effect of the 
mitigation. Imagine, for example, a job applicant who mitigates her 
disability by taking a medicine that leaves her with no substantial 
limitations, but has the side effect of producing a modest weight gain 
(which is not, of course, considered a disability itself) .175 An employer 
refuses to hire the applicant because of her weight gain, although it 
does not believe that the applicant is substantially limited in a major 
life activity. 
Here, too, protecting this applicant as a "regarded as" disabled 
person would advance legitimate interests under the statute. Suppose, 
for instance, that the employer has refused to hire the job applicant 
with a side effect of modest weight gain because the employer simply 
dislikes overweight people. Title I is not concerned about protecting 
the modestly overweight in general, but this job applicant's weight 
gain is tied to what the duty to mitigate recognizes as important 
interests under the statute. One of the premises of a duty of 
reasonable mitigation is that side effects can be an inherent part of 
mitigation that is worth undertaking. This duty would require a job 
174. Id. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a). 
175. See, e.g. , Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The allegations, 
which we take as true, establish only that the officers have certain physical characteristics 
either being marginally above a weight limit or marginally below a fitness standard which 
Ohio has deemed inconsistent with the job requirements of certain law enforcement 
positions . . . .  We thus find that Ohio is entitled to its motion to dismiss."); Murray v. John 
D. Archbold Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 1999) ("Exceeding the 
boundaries of Defendants' weight policy is no disability at all because the policy drew the 
line at figures which would exceed the maximum desirable weight of large-framed men and 
women plus 30% of that weight, figures that are well below the measures for morbid 
obesity."). 
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applicant to assume side effects, as long as they are side effects that a 
reasonable person in the same situation would assume. Denying this 
applicant Title I protection can function in a way that treats the 
benefits of mitigation and the associated side effects as separate 
phenomena, leaving the applicant vulnerable to adverse employment 
decisions based on those side effects. Protecting a job applicant or 
employee from employment discrimination based on the side effects 
of mitigation, like weight gain, would recognize that these side effects 
are inextricably linked to the fact that the person is mitigating, and the 
fact that she is mitigating is inextricably linked to both the substantial 
personal benefits of mitigation and the duty to mitigat.e that I advocate 
imposing. 
An employer's legitimate interests are safeguarded, moreover. An 
employer is not required to provide someone who has non­
substantially-limiting side effects with reasonable accommodations, 
even if the person counts as "regarded as" disabled, and an employer 
has to hire only those people who can perform the essential functions 
of the job. In most cases, a modest weight gain will not disqualify 
someone from performing a job, but in some cases it might. So, for 
instance, a fashion company would still be able to refuse modeling 
work to an applicant with a modest weight gain if that weight gain 
made the applicant unqualified for modeling work. A factory would 
still be able to refuse work as a machine operator to an applicant with 
a modest weight gain if that weight gain made the applicant unable to 
operate the factory's machines at the required rate. Classifying 
plaintiffs who are discriminated against because they had to mitigate 
or because they have non-substantially-limiting side effects from 
mitigation as "regarded as" disabled persons would advance legitimate 
interests under Title I, without infringing upon the legitimate interests 
of employers. 
IV. THE DUTY TO MITIGATE AND AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN TITLE I AND TITLE VII 
Thus far, I have considered the case for imposing a duty of 
reasonable mitigation on people seeking the protection of Title l's 
accommodation provision, and examined the rights of mitigators in 
light of that duty. This final Part of the Article uses the duty to 
mitigate issue to illuminate an important difference between Title l's 
accommodation provision and the prohibition on intentional 
discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans 
employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. "176 It argues that Title VII should not require 
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
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mitigation. In some contexts, as with Title I's reasonable 
accommodation provision, imposing a duty to mitigate can serve 
legitimate interests under a statute. But placing a duty to mitigate on 
Title VII plaintiffs-which the Title VII jurisprudence officially does 
not do but arguably might be doing indirectly-would not serve what 
Title VII recognizes as legitimate interests. Instead, it would allow 
employers to avoid costs that reflect the very sort of prejudice that 
Title VII seeks to disestablish. 
Title l's reasonable accommodation provision and Title VII's 
intentional discrimination prohibition attach different moral or 
normative weight to the costs that they place on employers. As we 
have seen, Title l's reasonable accommodation provision recognizes 
that employers have a legitimate interest in minimizing the costs 
associated with providing accommodation, and this is a powerful 
reason for imposing a duty to mitigate on people seeking 
accommodation under Title 1.177 In contrast, however, Title VII 
operates on the assumption that the costs placed on employers who 
must hire regardless of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin 
give employers no legitimate ground for complaint, because these 
costs reflect Title VII's central moral and normative goals. Title VII 
may force employers to alienate prejudiced customers and coworkers 
by adopting nondiscriminatory hiring policies,178 but the statute is 
meant to combat rather than indulge that type of prejudice. As one 
court deciding a sex discrimination claim under Title VII noted, for 
example, "it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the 
preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the 
sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these 
very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome."179 Similarly, Title 
VII may prohibit employers from acting based on statistically accurate 
generalizations about a protected class,180 but the Title VII 
jurisprudence also identifies these generalizations as a form of 
impermissible bias. As the Supreme Court has explained, " [e]ven a 
true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for 
disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not 
apply."181 " [T]he basic policy of [Title VII] requires that we focus on 
fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes. Practices that 
classify employees in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59. 
178. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
179. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971). 
180. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
181. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978). 
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traditional assumptions about groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny 
of individuals."182 
Phrased another way, Title I's reasonable accommodation 
provision recognizes that an employer does have a legitimate reason 
to prefer an employee or job applicant who needs less 
accommodation, or no accommodation. But Title VIl's prohibition on 
intentional discrimination operates on the premise that it is 
illegitimate for an employer to prefer an employee or job applicant 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The only 
exception Title VII makes is for those rare situations in which religion, 
sex, or national origin is a "bona fide occupational qualification," and 
this a very narrow exception that does not accept cost as a permissible 
reason for refusing to employ a protected person.183 
In this light, it is clear why Title VII plaintiffs should not be 
obligated to mitigate their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
In the context of Title VII, mitigating a plaintiff's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin would mean respecting employer interests that 
the statute understands to be illegitimate. Indeed, the reasons for not 
imposing a duty to mitigate under Title VII are very similar to the 
reasons for not imposing a duty to mitigate on a Title I plaintiff where 
mitigation could not decrease the plaintiff's need for accommodation. 
As explained above, only mitigation that could diminish a Title I 
plaintiff's accommodation requirements could serve an employer's 
legitimate interest under Title I in minimizing the cost of the 
accommodations that the employer provides.184 Employers have no 
legitimate interest under Title I in being able to discriminate against a 
disabled person because he is disabled, when the disabled person can 
perform the job in question as it is currently structured without 
accommodation. Stated more generally, mitigation is only appropriate 
when it is serving legitimate interests under the statute. It is not 
appropriate when it would enable employers to avoid costs that reflect 
the very sort of bias that the statute seeks to combat. 
182 Id. at 709. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. The congressmen who enacted Title VII's 
"BFOQ" exception explained that it would, for example, permit a Jewish congregation to 
hire "Jewish cantors and rabbis," 110 CONG. REC. 2559 (1964) (statement of Rep. Corman), 
"an elderly woman" to hire "a female nurse," id. at 2718 (statement of Rep. Goodell), and 
"a French restaurant" to hire "a French cook," id. at 7213 ("INTERPRETATIVE 
MEMORANDUM OF TITLE VII OF H.R. 7152 SUBMITTED JOINTLY BY SENATOR JOSEPH S. 
CLARK AND SENATOR CLIFFORD P. CASE, FLOOR MANAGERS"); see also id. at 2549 
(statement of Rep. Rodino) ("[N]ational origin in the operation of a specialty restaurant 
such as a French restaurant or Italian restaurant could properly be an occupational 
qualification that is reasonably necessary to the operation of the restaurant business."); id. at 
13,170 (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("[I]t would not constitute an unlawful employment practice 
to hire a person of a particular religion, sex, or national origin in those limited circumstances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification. For example, 
an Italian chef could be employed for an Italian restaurant."). 
184. See supra Part II. 
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As a formal matter at least, Title VII conforms to this insight. It 
officially imposes no duty to mitigate on the plaintiffs seeking its 
protection. To some extent, the absence of a duty to mitigate under 
Title VII may simply reflect the difficulty of changing the 
characteristics that Title VII protects: race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin. But this explanation is insufficient. Most notably, a 
person experiencing employment discrimination because of his 
religion could change his religion by converting.185 If Title VII 
plaintiffs are not expected to convert, it is presumably because doing 
so would mean respecting the religious prejudices that the statute is 
designed to counter. 
At the same time, aspects of Title VIl's jurisprudence may 
arguably be imposing a duty to mitigate unofficially and as a matter of 
practice. Indeed, a longstanding debate in the Title VII case law and 
commentary can be usefully reconceived as a debate about mitigation 
and about whether Title VII jurisprudence currently imposes a duty to 
mitigate. 
At the moment, the debate about which employment policies 
should count as policies that discriminate based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin is framed around the question of how 
Title VII's protected classes are best defined. Title VII itself does not 
specify what it means by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 
and courts and commentators have disputed which definitions are 
most appropriate. For example, some courts contend that Title VII's 
prohibition on "sex" discrimination only reaches policies that penalize 
applicants or employees because of their biological sex (i.e., because 
of the fact that the applicant or employee is a woman or a man).186 
Other courts and commentators insist that Title VII's prohibition on 
"sex" discrimination should also be interpreted to reach policies that 
penalize applicants or employees because they do not conform to 
societal expectations about how women or men are supposed to act.187 
185. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Religion is, of 
course, a forbidden criterion [under Title VII], even though a matter of individual choice."). 
186. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1376-77, 1379 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that a requirement that employees conform to "the 'Brooks Brothers look,"' by 
dressing conservatively, wearing their hair up, and avoiding excessive makeup, is not an 
employment requirement based on sex under Title VII); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 
F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that discrimination based on a male job applicant's 
effeminacy is not sex-based discrimination under Title VII); Willingham v. Macon Tel. 
Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1086-88, 1091-93 (5th Cir. 1975) (en bane) (holding that a rule 
prohibiting male employees from having long hair is not a sex-based rule under Title VII); 
Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1389-92 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that a 
rule prohibiting female employees from wearing pants is not a sex-based rule under Title 
VII). 
187. For the most important articulation of this view, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an 
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she 
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."); see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 
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Similarly, some courts have suggested that Title VII's prohibition on 
"race" discrimination only reaches policies that penalize applicants or 
employees for being a member of a particular race,188 and some 
commentators have argued that Title VII's "race" discrimination 
prohibition should also be interpreted to reach an employment policy 
that penalizes applicants or employees who wear their hair in 
cornrows.189 Some Title VII decisions indicate that Title VIl's 
prohibition on "national origin" discrimination only reaches policies 
that penalize applicants or employees for hailing from a foreign 
country,190 and some courts and commentators have maintained that 
Title VIl's prohibition on "national origin" discrimination should also 
be interpreted to reach some employment policies that penalize 
Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII to 
the extent it occurs 'because of the plaintiff's sex. Sanchez asserts that the verbal abuse at 
issue was based upon the perception that he is effeminate and, therefore, occurred because 
of sex. In short, Sanchez contends that he was harassed because he failed to conform to a 
male stereotype. Sanchez's theory derives from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which the 
Supreme Court held that a woman who was denied partnership in an accounting firm 
because she did not match a sex stereotype had an actionable claim under Title VIL . . .  
Sanchez contends that the holding in Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man 
who is discriminated against for acting too feminine. We agree.") (citations omitted); 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, 
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2559-60 (1994) 
("Courts that decline to accept preemptive approaches to dress and appearance restrictions 
based on judgments about their triviality must face the question whether such restrictions 
discriminate 'on the basis of sex.' . . .  In addressing the question, however, courts again have 
tended to apply highly formal reasoning that accepts and builds upon prevailing community 
norms rather than challenging them."); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from 
Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995) ("I argue that, at least under Title VII, the existing statutory language 
and doctrinal categories, if correctly applied, already provide the necessary protection to 
both effeminate men and feminine women, as well as their masculine counterparts."). 
188. See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(holding that a rule prohibiting employees from wearing their hair in cornrows is not a race­
based rule under Title VII). 
189. See, e.g. , Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of 
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 366 ("The case of Rogers v. American Airlines upheld 
the right of employers to prohibit categorically the wearing of braided hairstyles in the 
workplace. The plaintiff, a black woman, argued that American Airline's policy 
discriminated against her specifically as a black woman. In effect, she based her claim on the 
interactive effects of racial and gender discrimination. The court chose, however, to base its 
decision principally on distinctions between biological and cultural conceptions of race. 
More importantly, it treated the plaintiff's claims of race and gender discrimination in the 
alternative and independent of each other, thus denying any interactive relationship between 
the two.") (footnote omitted). 
190. See, e.g. , Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1973) ("This case involves 
interpretation of the phrase 'national origin' in Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .  
The Court of Appeals . . .  conclud[ed] that the statutory phrase 'national origin' did not 
embrace citizenship. We . . .  affirm . . . .  The term 'national origin' on its face refers to the 
country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her 
ancestors came.'') (citation omitted); id. at 95 ("[N]othing in the Act makes it illegal to 
discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage."). 
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applicants or employees for speaking with a foreign accent.191 This 
Article is not the place for an evaluation of the merits of these 
arguments as a matter of interpreting Title VII, but the duty to 
mitigate issue discussed here provides a new way to understand what 
is at stake in this debate. 
The dispute now framed in terms of the appropriate definition of 
Title VII's protected classes can also be understood-perhaps more 
deeply-as a debate about mitigation. The courts and commentators 
who believe that some of the Title VII case law has defined the Title 
VII protected classes too narrowly can be understood as arguing that 
this case law has functioned to impose a duty to mitigate on Title VII 
plaintiffs, by requiring them to change or lessen aspects of themselves 
that are part of their protected characteristics. The courts that define 
the meaning of the Title VII classes more strictly can be understood as 
contending that their Title VII jurisprudence imposes no duty to 
mitigate, because it does not require an employee or applicant to 
change anything that should count as part of a protected characteristic. 
The unspoken premise that underlies both sides of this argument is 
that if expectations of feminine behavior from women are part of what 
"sex" means, and if wearing one's hair in certain styles is part of what 
"race" means, and if having a foreign accent is part of what "national 
origin" means, then an employee or applicant should not have to 
change those aspects of himself in order to secure protection under 
Title VII. Courts and commentators may dispute whether Title VII's 
case law currently imposes a duty to mitigate, but both sides of this 
debate implicitly agree that Title VII should not impose such a duty. 
Title VII plaintiffs should not have to change their protected 
characteristics, or lessen the impact of their protected characteristics, 
because such a mitigation requirement would serve to respect the very 
prejudices that Title VII seeks to contest. As our exploration of the 
duty to mitigate issue under Title I illustrates, imposing a duty to 
mitigate is only appropriate when it serves legitimate interests under 
the operative statute. 
191. See, e.g. , Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that accent discrimination can constitute national origin discrimination under Title 
VII when the plaintiffs accent does not "interfereO materially with job performance"); Mari 
J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the 
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1367-68 (1991) (arguing that courts deciding 
whether an instance of accent discrimination constitutes discrimination under Title VII 
"should consider four separate questions": "1. What level of communication is required for 
the job? 2. Was the candidate's speech fairly evaluated? 3. Is the candidate intelligible to the 
pool of relevant, nonprejudiced listeners, such that job performance is not unreasonably 
impeded? 4. What accommodations are reasonable given the job and any limitations in 
intelligibility?"). 
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CONCLUSION 
The question of whether plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title 
I's reasonable accommodation provision should be under a duty to 
mitigate is important doctrinally, and it will have to be decided. But 
the issue of mitigation also helps cast light on Title I's reasonable 
accommodation provision, and a crucial difference between that 
provision and Title VII's prohibition on intentional discrimination. 
Mitigation involves not only questions of costs and the interests of 
employers versus employees and job applicants. At its core, it is about 
which costs and which interests an antidiscrimination statute 
recognizes as legitimate concerns, which interests the statute identifies 
as merely a form of bias, and which costs the statute is willing to 
impose as part of the price for combating discrimination. 
